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Abstract 
New Deal Labor Reforms and its Aftermath 
The Flawed Evolution of the American Labor-Management Model as regards Center Firms, 
1945-1980 
Erik de Gier 
Research paper American studies 
Aim 
The aim of this research paper  is to provide a historical analysis of the post-war social 
compact in the U.S. Did a more or less balanced compact between the American 
administrative complex (Government, Congress and political parties), employers of large 
center firms and trade unions exist between 1945-1980? To what extent was this period 
unique in the history and evolution of the American system of labor and industrial relations? 
F indings 
Between 1945-1980, there existed a social compact between the three main parties involved. 
However, from the onset one or more of the three parties contested this social compact almost 
permanently. As a result, about 1980 the social compact had been eroded significantly and 
VHHPHGQRORQJHUYLDEOH7KLVGRHVQ¶WMXVWLI\WKHFRQFOXVLRQGUDZQE\GLIIHUHQWH[SHUWVWKDW
the New Deal and its aftermath until 1980 should be considered as unique and as an exception 
in the history of American labor and industrial relations. Rather, it can be contended that if the 
New Deal had in time adopted more elements of the preceding factory system and welfare 
capitalism of large firms a less exceptional and also more linear and gradual evolution of the 
post-war American system of labor and industrial relations would have been more likely. 
Research limitations/implications 
There is an abundance of literature about the New Deal and its aftermath pointing 
predominantly into the direction of American exceptionalism. 
O riginality/value  
This study tends to adapt and revise the current dominant interpretation of post-war American 
labor and industrial relations by combining a thematic and systems approach. 
K eywords: American post-war labor relations, economic democracy, welfare capitalism, 
American labor policy, New Deal, Great Society 
    
3  
 
 
 
³,WLVLPSRVVLEOHWRH[SODLQVDWLVIDFWRULO\WKHGHYHORSPHQWRf the ideas and practices which 
have made the modern American industrial relations system what it is if the focus is fixed too 
QDUURZO\RQRQHGHFDGH´ 
Howell John Harris, The Right To Manage (Harris, 1982: 5) 
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 Summary 
In this research paper I analyze and assess the American labor-management model between 
1945 and 1980 at both the company level and the institutional level. This period has been 
GHFLVLYHIRUFXUUHQW$PHULFDQLQGXVWULDODQGODERUUHODWLRQV,WEULGJHV5RRVHYHOW¶VLPSRUWDQW
New Deal labor reforms, JohnsRQ¶V*UHDW6RFLHW\UHIRUPSURJUDPVDQGWKHODWHUGHFOLQHRID
progressive working class and union power. By comparatively analyzing the strategies 
executed by American center companies1, organized labor (in particular the United Auto 
Workers, UAW) and the state I demonstrate the gradual eclipse of the American labor-
management model as created by these three actors. First of all, it turns out that this model, 
from the beginning, has been flawed by conflicts between the three institutional players as 
well as by internal conflicts2. Secondly, the eclipse of the model has also been caused by 
contingent external factors such as the issue of race and civil rights, the historical split 
between the Old and New Left, and the rather unexpected and sudden advent of flexible 
Japanese production systems from the 1970s. However, most important for the ultimate 
eclipse of the model has been the flawed reception of pre-New Deal experiences in the system 
of industrial and labor relations in the U.S. in the postwar labor-management model. In 
hindsight, it is rather exceptional that welfare capitalist experiences of American center 
companies were almost completely absent in the New Deal labor reforms and the subsequent 
labor-management model between 1945 and 1980.     
                                                                                                                    
1  ,ĂƌƌŝƐƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽZŝĐŚĂƌĚd͘ǀĞƌŝƚƚ͛ƐĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ͞ĐĞŶƚĞƌĨŝƌŵƐ͗͟͞dŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌĨŝƌŵŝƐůĂƌŐĞŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŝǌĞĂƐ
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞĚďǇŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞƐ͕ƚŽƚĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐ͕ĂŶĚŝŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŝǌĞĂŶĚǇĞĂƌůǇƐĂůĞƐ͙ĞŶƚĞƌĨŝƌŵƐĞǆĐĞůŝŶ
managerial  and  technical  taleŶƚ͖ƚŚĞŝƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĂƌĞĂďƵŶĚĂŶƚ͙ĞŶƚĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĐŽŵďŝŶĞĂůŽŶŐ-­‐
run  with  a  short-­‐ƌƵŶƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ͙dŚĞŝƌŵĂƌŬĞƚƐĂƌĞĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚ͟;,ĂƌƌŝƐ͕ϭϵϴϮ͗ϭϮͿ͘/ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ/
use  alternately  the  terms  center  firms  and  large  American  companies.  By  center  firms  I  mean  companies  as  GE,  
GM  and  U.S.  Steel.    
2  /ŶƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌ/ĚŽŶ͛ƚƉĂǇĂƐƐƵĐŚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŝŶƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĐĞŶƚĞƌ
companies.  Much  has  been  written  about  this  elsewhere.  See  for  example  the  various  publications  of  Nelson  
Lichtenstein  as  well  as  Fraser  (1991),  and  on  internal  conflicts  in  GM,  Freeland  (2001).  
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1. Introduction 
In my recent case study Paradise Lost Revisited: GM & the UAW in Historical Perspective I 
described and analyzed the evolving relationship between the UAW and GM (De Gier, 2010). 
Between 1936 and 2009 this relationship took three consecutive, but fundamentally different 
forms. In the first decade between 1936 and 1945 the most important objective of the UAW 
was recognition of the then new union by GM. From the second half of the 1940s until the 
1970s the main attention of both parties shifted towards a more dynamic wage policy as well 
DVWRZDUGVWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDµSULYDWHZHOIDUHVWDWH¶LQVLGH*0)LQDOO\IURPWKHV
onwards the safeguarding of job security became the main objective of the UAW, whereas 
GM tried to maximize its maneuvering room to transform its until then dominant Fordist 
production system into a more flexible one. 
What became also obvious in this study is that the main parties involved, along with the UAW 
and GM, this was also the American government and its administrative apparatus, all had 
their own specific strategies with respect to each other. These strategies differed over time. 
The question then arises to what extent these strategies were interwoven and caused a certain 
output with respect to the dominant labor-management model in a certain period. Moreover, 
has there been one party which was more powerful than the other two or could we speak of a 
more or less balanced power relationship between the three main players? In other words, did 
a balanced social compact exist in the U.S during the so-called golden post-war years between 
1945-1980?  
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2. Research objective and research questions 
The time period between 1945-1980 is usually considered as the heyday of mass production 
and mass consumption. By contrast, the period after 1980 until to-day, differs radically from 
the foregoing period of mass production and mass consumption. Fordism became rather 
rapidly replaced by Post-Fordism. The core of Post-Fordism is flexible production and 
globalization of production systems with far reaching consequences for the labor-management 
model and the employment relationship. The rapid overnight change from Fordism into Post-
Fordism was caused largely by technological developments, changing markets and the rise 
and increasing influence of Japanese lean production systems. In the era of Post-Fordism the 
power of unions decreased substantially, whereas at the same time the influence of 
management, but also to some extent individual workers on labor relations increased. 
In this study I will not focus my attention on the Post-Fordist period, but on the Fordist era, 
1945-1980. More in particular, I will analyze the American corporate labor-management 
model in this period. The main question to be answered is if there existed between 1945-1980 
a more or less balanced social compact in the U.S. between trade unions, employers and the 
government, comparable to corporatist social compacts that existed in Europe then? 
As a more or less provoking starting point for this study I will take the theoretical concept of 
WKH³1HZ,QGXVWULDO6WDWH´DVGHYHORSHGE\WKHODWHIDPRXV+DUYDUGHFRQRPLVW-RKQ.HQQHWK
Galbraith. In his seminal book The New Industrial State he defined the New Industrial State 
as characterized by a close fusion of the industrial system with the state. Modern big 
American corporations, such as GM, collaborated narrowly with their public counterparts  
³QRWRQO\LQWKHGHYHORSPHQWDQGPDQXIDFWXUHRISURGXFWVEXWLQDGYLVLQJWKHPRIWKHLU
QHHGV´*DOEUDith, 1967: 392). In the end, Galbraith stated, the mature corporation will 
EHFRPHSDUWRIWKHODUJHUDGPLQLVWUDWLYHFRPSOH[DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHVWDWH³,QWLPHWKHOLQH
between the two will disappear´ (Galbraith 1967: 393). 
It is important to realize that Galbraith wrote his book during the turbulent Vietnam War days. 
Perhaps, at the time he was overstating a bit the importance of the state. Nevertheless, the 
large postwar modern American (center) corporation had strong links indeed with the state 
and the government. As an example Galbraith mentioned the rather easy moves across the 
lines of retired admirals and generals, but also high civil servants. What is more, the 
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relationship of the industrial system with the state over time also negatively influenced the 
relationship between the unions on the one hand and the large corporations and the state on 
the other hand.  
:KDWZHFDQSDUWLFXODUO\OHDUQIURP*DOEUDLWK¶VDSSURDFKLVWKHLPSRUWDQWUROHRIWKHVWDWHLQ
the US in this time period as regards the then dominant labor-management model. Business 
historians Tolliday and Zeitlin confirm this (Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1991). They contend that, in 
general, models of enterprise management are shaped to a large extent by a distinctive set of 
environmental conditions, such as technological factors and economic factors. As such, the 
development of the American mass production system is a result of, for example, a vast 
national market, a relatively egalitarian income distribution and peculiarities of the American 
labor market. But apart from that, also the wider institutional and political environment has 
EHHQH[WUHPHO\UHOHYDQWLQWKH86³WKHODERUSROLFLHVRI86FRPSDQLHVZHUHGHFLVLYHO\
influenced by legal and political intervention at the local and the national levels. For example, 
many of the difficulties of American unions before the 1930s arose directly from judicial 
hostility to any form of collective worker action, and from the willingness of elected officials 
and government officers to use the police and the military for strike-breaking purposes. 
Government policies and judicial decisions during and after the New Deal were likewise 
crucial for the development of the legalistic, contractual system of industrial relations that 
FDPHWRUHJXODWHODERXUPDQDJHPHQWLQXQLRQL]HGFRPSDQLHV´7ROOLGD\	=HLWOLQ 1991: 286-
,QRWKHUZRUGV´ZLWKRXWWKHSROLWLFDOFRQWH[WRIWKH1HZ'HDODQGWKHVXSSRUWRIWKH
Federal government, first under the Wagner Act and then under the War Labor Board, it is 
unlikely that the newly formed industrial unions could have overcome the resistance of the 
JLDQWFRUSRUDWLRQVVXFKDV*0DQG)RUG´7ROOLGD\	=HLWOLQ-8). 
In sum, the American labor-management model between 1945-1980 was not only a result of 
the struggle between employers and workers and their unions, but also of state intervention or 
initially also the lack of state intervention. Extremely relevant in this respect are not only the 
New Deal labor policy and its aftermath, which marks the beginning of this period, but also 
3UHVLGHQW-RKQVRQ¶V*UHDW Society programs, which in turn mark the beginning of the end of 
the liberal political era from the 1960s onward. What is more, if the observation of Tolliday 
and Zeitlin is correct, the influence and behavior of the state has been decisive in shaping and 
regulating the American labor management model between 1945-1980. In the years prior to 
the New Deal, as a consequence of a lack of government intervention the voice of workers 
remained weak and consequently the voice of the American employers remained relatively 
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strong. The employers¶YRLFHLn turn, was influenced ³E\WKHLUGHHSDWWDFKPHQWWR
individualist values and unilateral control associated with a liberal conception of property 
ULJKWV´Tolliday & Zeitlin, 1991: 288).   
In this study I will analyze more in detail the American labor-management model in the so-
called Fordist period between 1945-1980 by focusing on corporate America. For example, 
GM was not only for quite a long time the largest corporation in the US in this period, also 
labor relations in the car industry, the related steel industry and a corporation as GM were 
exemplary for the relationships in the New Industrial State between this corporation, the 
Union of Automobile Workers (UAW) and the state.  
My research question is based on the outcome of my former case study Paradise Lost 
Revisited (De Gier 2010) and more in particular also on the conclusion that the historic 
relationship between UAW and GM and other big American corporations between 1945-1980 
was co-created and influenced strongly by the state. By the state I mean the American 
political and administrative system consisting of the three branches: law making, the 
executive branch and the judiciary branch. More specifically, I want to know to what extent 
the state in this period was decisive in shaping the resulting management-labor model and, as 
a corollary also gave direction to the attitude of both organized labor and the management of 
GM and of other large industrial corporations in the U.S.  
In order to be able to address this question properly I will analyze the following two related 
issues. 
(a): The development and significance of liberalism for the American labor-management 
model between 1945-1980 and in particular , the role played by the U A W in this broader 
context.  
As Paradise Lost Revisited has shown the UAW rather quickly left the path of shop floor 
militancy and from 1945 onward developed itself primarily into a large and centralist 
bargaining machinery vis-à-vis the management of GM at the national and company level. 
Katz has summarized this bargaining machine strikingly with the following three key 
IHDWXUHV³WKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIZDJHVWKURXJKIRUPXOD-like wage rules in multi-year national 
contracts; a connective bargaining system structure defining the relationship between national 
and plant-level bargaining; and a job-control focus premised on the contractual resolution of 
GLVDJUHHPHQWDQGWKHOLQNLQJRIZRUNHUULJKWVWRVWULFWMREGHILQLWLRQV´.DW]2Q
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top of this, the UAW and more in particular its powerful chairman Walter Reuther propagated 
a system of economic democracy in the U.S., which VKRXOGIXUWKHUHQODUJHZRUNHUV¶ influence 
DQGZHDOWK7KHJRDORIHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\ZDVWREURDGHQWKHJHUPLQDWLQJµSULYDWHZHOIDUH
VWDWH¶LQVLGH*0WRZDUGVDVRFLDOZHOIDUHVWDWHLQ the U.S. In the end, Reutherism3 as far as 
the development of economic democracy in the U.S. is concerned, became a failure. This was 
not only caused by a shrinking political interest in the idea of economic democracy, but also 
E\WKHµHQGRIOLEHUDOLVP¶in due course (Boyle, 1995; Brinkley, 1998). The question is which 
factors enabled the rise and decline of the idea of economic democracy and what can be said 
in this respect about the relationship between the UAW and the state? 
(b): The development of personnel management in large American corporations as 
related to the bargaining policy of trade unions, such as the U A W and the 
institutionalized employment relations in the U .S.  
The core of the latter are the historically important Wagner Act (1935) which facilitated the 
recognition of trade unions by company management from 1935 onward, the Taft-Hartley Act 
(1947) which restricted worker militancy at the shop floor level, but also later legislation in 
the field of labor law (Gross, 1995; Hogler, 2004). Also, the judiciary and in particular the 
Supreme Court has exerted a strong influence on American employment relations at several 
PRPHQWVLQWLPH,QLWLDOO\WKLVZDVPDLQO\DQHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFH%XWDIWHU5RRVHYHOW¶VµFRXUW-
packing plan¶ in 1937, the Supreme Court became more supportive to American liberalism 
(Shesol, 2010).  
,QDGGLWLRQWRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKH8$:DVWKHVROHEDUJDLQLQJSDUW\E\*0*0¶VODERU
policy, but also personnel management of other large industrial corporations, focused itself on 
winning back and maintaining shop floor control. Traditionally, the foreman had played a 
crucial role in this respect. After the implementation of the Taft-Hartley Act it became easier 
for GM and other industrial corporations to roll back worker militancy at the shop floor level 
/LFKWHQVWHLQ$WWKHVDPHWLPH8$:¶VIRFXVRQEDUJDLQLQJDWWKHQDWLRQDODQG
company level as well as its striving for economic democracy in the country left a separate 
                                                                                                                    
3  dŚĞƚĞƌŵZĞƵƚŚĞƌŝƐŵŝƐƵƐĞĚďǇ>ŝĐŚƚĞŶƐƚĞŝŶ͗͞ZĞƵƚŚĞƌŝƐŵĐĂŵĞƚŽĐŽŵďŝŶĞƚŚĞƚĂĐƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŽĨ
traditional  business  unionism  with  the  political  economy  of  liberal  Keynesianism  and  the  social  vision  of  
Western  European  social  democracy.  Through  the  1940s  and  even  well  into  the  1950s,  the  UAW  sought  to  use  
the  tools  of  collective  bargaining  as  a  lever  that  could  shift  the  balance  of  forces  in  the  political  economy  and  
ŽƉĞŶǁŝĚĞƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞ͟;>ŝĐŚƚĞŶƐƚĞŝŶϭϵϴϲ͗ϭϮϮͿ͘  
    
12  
competitive playing field to the company with respect to the development of its own labor 
policy or personnel management (Chandler, 1977; Chandler, 1990; Lazonick, 1991). For 
example, already before 1935, the Big Three car producers GM, Ford and Chrysler developed 
rather extensive employee or personnel policies on which they could further elaborate after 
World War II. These policies are called welfare capitalism.  
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3. Conceptual model  
The main research question in this study is to what extent the strategies of the three principal 
parties which traditionally have been shaping the American system of labor and industrial 
relations were interwoven between 1945 and 1980 and created a particular output with respect 
to the dominant labor-management model of this specific time period. The dominant labor 
management model may differ over time. That is, the balance of power between the three 
main parties may shift between one and the other party and moreover, the balance of power is 
co-influenced by occasional coalitions between two or all three parties as regards certain more 
specific themes. 
Two of the three parties are considered as the primary bargaining parties. These are the 
management of center corporations and organized labor. With respect to the employer and 
organized labor, WKHWKLUGSDUW\WKHVWDWHLVQ¶WSULPDULOy a bargaining party but a regulatory 
party. Therefore, the state apparatus consisting of the law making actors, the executive and the 
MXGLFLDU\FDQDOVREHFRQVLGHUHGDVDFUXFLDOµH[WHUQDO¶SROLWLFDOIDFWRU 
In order to be able to give an answer to the main research question this question is subdivided 
in the following two more specific research questions: 
(a) How can the ultimate failure of Reutherism, or the striving of the UAW for realizing 
economic democracy in the US after 1945, be explained? 
It is likely that increasing discontents about liberalism in the American society form a 
substantial part of the explanation of the eventual failure of Reutherism (Boyle, 2005; 
Brinkley, 1998). How precisely this has been the case will be the main subject of Chapter 5. 
In that chapter I will not only pay attention to the gradual evolution of the main ideas behind 
WKH1HZ'HDOGXULQJDQGDIWHU5RRVHYHOW¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQXQWLOWKHV,ZLOODOVRSD\
attention to the fundamental split between the Old Left, represented by the trade unions and 
more in particular the UAW, and the New Left mainly consisting of intellectuals from the 
1960s onward. The New Left embodied strong discontents with the social reform oriented Old 
Left. Instead, the main focus of the New Left was not the realization of economic democracy 
in the US but the realization of equal civil rights of all American citizens. According to the 
late American philosopher Richard Rorty the structural division on the left between social 
reformers and civil rights activists is an important explanation of the increasing weakness of 
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the American trade unions since the 1960s. What is more, it also explains the decreasing 
reform capacity of American society until today (Rorty, 1999).   
Figure 1 pictures and further specifies the relationship between discontents about American 
OLEHUDOLVPDQGWKHXOWLPDWHIDLOXUHRI8$:¶VLGHDORIHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\LQWKH86 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between liberalism and economic democracy 
 
Discontents with American liberalism         Æ           )DLOXUHRIµHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\¶ 
- New Deal (F.D. Roosevelt)                                                       - WKHHQGRIµ5HXWKHULVP¶ 
- Fair Deal (H. Truman)              - UAW v. civil rights movement 
- Great Society (L.B. Johnson) 
- Split American left 
 
(b) Which factors explain the dominance of GM and other large industrial corporations with 
respect to job control at the shop floor level after 1945 until about 1980? 
This question, which will be dealt with in Chapter 6, is closely related to the actual 
development of personnel management of large American corporations before and after 1945 
and supported by federal labor law initiatives of which the Taft Hartley Act (1947) is the most 
substantial piece of labor law. In fact, personnel management of big American industrial 
corporations initially focused on rolling back worker militancy at the shop floor level by re-
instating and confirming the lowest managerial role in the company. That was the role of the 
foreman. This was supported by the introduction of legal grievance procedures in order to 
prevent spontaneous militant work stoppages. For example, also the UAW agreed to this in 
exchange for more bargaining power at the corporate level and more political influence. 
Nevertheless, the continuing tension between shop floor control and collective bargaining at 
the corporate and company level remained a permanent dilemma to the UAW. 
 
Figure 2 pictures and further specifies the relationship between post-war political initiatives, 
organized labRU¶Vpost-war bargaining policy and personnel management of center companies. 
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Figure 2:  Relationship betwHHQSROLWLFDOLQLWLDWLYHVRUJDQL]HGODERU¶VEDUJDLQLQJSROLF\DQG
personnel or employee policy of center companies 
 
Federal labor law and its administration  
                                                                             Æ         Personnel management  corporations     
8$:¶VEDUJDLQLQJSROLF\MREFRQWURO  
                                     
Taken together, combining Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 pictures the conceptual model, which 
will be applied in this study. 
Figure 3: Conceptual model The American labor-management model 1945 ± 1980 
                                       
Discontents with American liberalism/              
 )DLOXUHRIµHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\¶LGHDORI8$:  
                                                               Æ 
8$:¶VEDUJDLQLQJSROLF\Æ  American labor-management model 1945-80           
                                                               Æ         
Personnel management large corporations 
 
Federal labor law and its administration                         
 
In Chapter 7, I will combine the results of Chapters 5 and 6 in order to capture more fully the 
rather intricate American labor management-model between 1945 and 1980. Also, the 
question will be raised if this model was time bound and uniquely American, so that it may be 
considered as a unique and temporary form of American exceptionalism. More in particular, 
the recent and provoking hypothesis of labor historians Cowie & Salvatore will be assessed 
(Cowie & Salvatore, 2008). With hindsight, both historians consider the New Deal and its 
aftermath primarily as an exceptional and accidental byproduct of the massive crisis of the 
Great Depression and not so much as a part of a potential linear development towards an 
American welfare state. 
    
16  
4.   A brief note on methodology 
The methodology used in this research study is basically desk-research of available secondary 
sources. 
Part of the work has been administered during a stay of four weeks of the author as visiting 
IHOORZDW&RUQHOO¶V6FKRRORI/DERUDQG,QGXVWULDO5HODWLRQV,/5LQ6HSWHPEHU7KLV
made it not only possible to have an additional oral exchange of ideas with some of the 
VFKRRO¶VUHQRZQHGLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQVH[SHUWVEXWDOVRWRPDNHXVHRILWVH[WHQVLYH0DUWLQ3
Catherwood Library. 
This is primarily a historical study. Although it has a descriptive character, in the background 
I also use some theoretical notions. In particular, systems- or institutional theory, stating that 
personnel or employee policies of companies to a large extent are influenced by several 
external factors such as political, social and moral factors, is relevant (Scott, 2001). On the 
other hand, also discretional power of organizations remains substantial. Their behavior and 
policies are not fully externally determined.  Organizations also act as autonomous agents.   
The available scientific literature about the New Deal and its post-war aftermath is abundant 
and mainly historical, social scientific and economic. In addition, over time the assessment of 
the time period 1945-1980 has changed from a mainly positive interpretation of social reforms 
directly after World War II towards a more critical and sometimes even negative 
interpretation of that period nowadays. Therefore, in this study it has been tried to make a 
deliberate selection of the available literature primarily by selecting three important historical 
issues related to one of each of the three main parties involved. These are, the increasing 
discontents with American liberalism (government, administration and political parties), the 
striving of the UAW after economic democracy in the U.S. related to its company bargaining 
policy and finally, the development of personnel management of large center firms4 related to 
lobbying initiatives of employer interest groups at the federal state level.  
I realize that the choices I made are subjective and therefore disputable. For example, 
researching the nature of a social compact usually includes a balanced analysis of activities of 
                                                                                                                    
4  Personnel  management  of  large  corporations  has  a  long  and  remarkable  pre-­‐war  history  in  the  U.S.  dating  
back  to  the  end  of  the  19th  and  the  first  decades  of  the  20th  century.  Therefore,  in  Chapter  6  (Paragraph  6.1)  I  
will  have  to  take  a  longer  time  period  as  a  starting  point.  I  will  do  the  same  in  Paragraph  6.2  on  the  role  and  
significance  of  the  National  Labor  Relations  Board  (NLRB).  The  pre-­‐war  history  of  the  NLRB  is  important  for  
understanding  correctly  its  post-­‐war  fortunes.  
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the three parties involved at the soc-called macro level (Dunlop, 1958). However, by choosing 
instead different thematic subjects and by analyzing these alternately both at the company and 
state level I hope to have added a new viewpoint to the interpretation of post-war American 
labor relations.  
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5. American liberalism and the UAW after World war II 
In this chapter I will deal with the role and influence of progressive liberalism on American 
politics. First, I will pay attention to the changing importance of the concept of economic 
democracy in the political strategy of the AFL-CIO and the UAW in the post-war years. Then 
I will move to the 1960s and 1970s. These were the years of the second big wave of liberal 
UHIRUPVDIWHU5RRVHYHOW¶V1HZ'HDOLQWKH0s. Paragraphs 5.1 and par 5.2 are mainly 
historical-descriptive. Therefore, in the concluding Paragraph 5.3 I will summarize and assess 
the historical development of postwar liberalism and more in particular, the role of organized 
labor in this respect. 
5.1 Economic democracy and discontents with liberalism 
The post-war period before the start of the Reagan presidency in 1981 is generally considered 
as the golden age of American liberalism. It was also the heyday of the American labor 
movement. Particularly, the larger and more important American industrial trade unions, such 
as the UAW, booked far-reaching bargaining results for their members at the company level 
(De Gier, 2010). By 1945 about thirty percent of American workers were organized. This 
organization density for the first time in history approached the organization density of 
Northern Europe (Lichtenstein, 2002: 100). 
)UDVHUDQG*HUVWOHUHIHUWRWKLVSHULRGDVWKHµ7KLUG5HSXEOLFRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶5.  They 
consider it as the product of the New Deal and the civil rights revolution, spanning the 
presidencies of F.D. Roosevelt and L.B. Johnson (Fraser & Gerstle, 2005: 254). If we stretch 
this period a bit to 1930-1981 a more appropriate FLUFXPVFULSWLRQLVµWKH1HZ'HDO2UGHU¶
(Fraser & Gerstle, 1989). 
Although seen as the golden age of American liberalism, the New Deal Order was not a 
period without conflict and change. On the contrary, after initial successes the New Deal 
Order rapidly came under severe pressure, both from within liberalism and from without, and 
in due course collapsed. 
Fraser and Gerstle discern at least two successive periods: the New Deal era from Roosevelt 
                                                                                                                    
5  The  First  Republic  covers  the  period  from  the  independence  until  the  Civil  War.  The  Second  Republic  lasted  
until  the  Great  Depression  in  the  1930s  (Fraser  &  Gerstle  2005:  254).  
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to Johnson and the conservative era thereafter (Fraser and Gerstle 2005: 285). After the 
decline of the New Deal Order a conservative revolution took place in the U.S. that primarily 
favored the interests of the big corporations and minimized ODERU¶VYRLFH 
The perception of the sustainability of the New Deal Order was completely different directly 
after World War II and to some extent all the way until the 1970s. For example, industrial 
relations expert Sumner H. Schlichter contended in 1948 that the union movement had placed 
WKH86³RQWKHWKUHVKROGRIPDMRUFKDQJHVLQLWVHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´FLW
Brody, 1993: 239). In 1969, J. David Greenstone went even further in his Labor in American 
Politics and defined labor as an organized constituency of the Democratic Party which not 
only protected the interests of a specific group of workers, but also the broader general 
interest. He perceived American labor as being on the verge of creating a new form of class 
politics against producers (Greenstone, 1969: 361-362).  
All in all, the trade unions had captured for themselves an important role in American 
political life (Brody, 1993: 218). This new extended role of labor, in addition to company 
bargaining, is calOHGµQHZXQLRQLVP¶DQGhas a history dating back to the period before World 
War II (Howe, 1991). After World War II the UAW and its chairman Walter Reuther mainly 
embodied the new unionism. At that moment, the UAW had 1.3 million members, and was 
the biggest union in de U.S., encompassing five percent of the American electorate. The 
challenges Reuther met were huge: "a poisoned legacy of an obsessive anticommunism, an 
alliance with an unreformed Democratic party and the transformation and demobilization of 
the UAW itself" (Lichtenstein, 1995: 300). 
The new unionism within American labor developed first in the 1930s in the wake of Franklin 
'5RRVHYHOW¶V1HZ'HDORQWKHEDVLVRIWKHH[WHQVLRQRIODERUULJKWV:DJQHU$FWDV
well as the recognition of trade unions by the employers after 1937 (De Gier, 2010). One of 
the first trade unionists that propagated the new unionism was the president of the AFL-
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Sidney Hillman. Hillman, a former Eastern-European 
Jewish immigrant to the U.S., favored state capLWDOLVWSODQQLQJRUµVRFLDO.H\QHVLDQLVP¶DQG
because of that was inclined to participate in the New Deal in order to contribute to the 
realization of a real American welfare state (Howe 1991; Fraser, 1991). During the Second 
World War, according to Howe, KHKDGEHFRPHD³ODERUVWDWHVPDQ´³VHUYLQJDVODERU¶V
representative on various boards where he collaborated, if not quite on equal terms, with 
:LOOLDP.QXGVHQKHDGRI*HQHUDO0RWRUV´+RZH 
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The broader context of the pre-1945 efforts of American labor to acquire a voice in the 
political process has been meticulously described by David Brody and Nelson Lichtenstein 
and will be summarized briefly hereafter (Brody, 1993: 199-241; Lichtenstein, 1989: 122-
152). 
It started in the beginning of the Twentieth Century when Congress became gradually more 
involved in labor matters. But only from the 1930s onward did the labor movement widen its 
SROLWLFDODFWLYLWLHVIURPPHUHµLQWHUHVW-JURXSSROLWLFNLQJ¶WRDµEURDGHUUDQJHRIVRFLDOLVVXHV¶
The labor movement, and more in particular the AFL and the CIO, discovered during the 
Great Depression that the general well-being of workers is served by connecting labor matters 
ZLWKWKHIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKHQDWLRQDOHFRQRP\DQGWKHODUJHUVRFLHW\5RRVHYHOW¶V1HZ'HDO
offeUHGWKHULJKWYHKLFOHWRUHDOL]HODERU¶VQHZDPELWLRQ*RDOZDVWKHUHDOL]DWLRQRIDZHOIDUH
state program consisting of a combination of national planning and a full employment policy. 
From a practical viewpoint, the reelection of Franklin D. Roosevelt after his first term as 
President became an important objective of organized labor. It therefore took the initiative of 
a Political Action Committee (PAC), organized by the CIO. In addition, directly after World 
:DU,,WKH$)/DOVRVWDUWHG/DERU¶V/HDJXHIRU Political Education. 
2QHRIWKHLPSRUWDQWGLVFXVVLRQSRLQWVIRUVRPHWLPHKDVEHHQWKHTXHVWLRQLIODERU¶VSROLWLFDO
action required its own labor party, as was the case in Great-Britain. The alternative was to 
capture sufficient influence on the existing two political parties. Although an American Labor 
SDUW\KDGEHHQVHWXSLQDQHZWKLUGSDUW\GLGQ¶WJHWHQRXJKVXSSRUWLQVLGHWKHODERU
movement. Important labor leaders, such as Sidney Hillman, CIO-president Philip Murray 
and finally after World War II also Walter Reuther, preferred a tight connection of labor with 
the Democratic Party. Reuther had been puzzling about the third party question for some time. 
He favored explicitly a new progressive party entailing all liberal American groups, but 
whether this should be a reformed Democratic party or a new labor party remained long 
ambiguous (Lichtenstein, 1995: 304).   
/DERU¶Vmost decisive argument against a third party was the risk of a division between labor 
and other progressives and because of that a loss of political power. An essential moment in 
the discussion about a third party arose anew after the succession of Franklin D. Roosevelt by 
Harry S. 7UXPDQ,QKHGLVPLVVHG³1HZ'HDOV\PERO´+HQU\:DOODFHIURPKLVFDELQHW
At the same time, TruPDQGLGQ¶WVXFFHHGWRFDUU\WKURXJKimportant post-war reforms, such 
as tax reform and unemployment insurance. This raised new voices in support of a new 
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SROLWLFDOSDUW\2QHRIWKHPZDV:DOWHU5HXWKHU¶VEURWKHUDQG8$:-activist Victor Reuther. 
Also the newly set up Progressive Citizens of America (PCA) argued for the possibility of an 
alternative for the politically weakened Democratic Party in December 1946.  
Finally, the discussion about an eventual new third and labor-friendly political party came to 
an end definitively in 1955 when the two national federated trade unions AFL and CIO 
PHUJHGZLWK:DOWHU5HXWKHUDVLWVQHZSUHVLGHQW:LWKKLQGVLJKWWKLVµVWUDWHJLF¶GHFLVLRQ
would have far-UHDFKLQJFRQVHTXHQFHVIRUODERU¶VYRLFHLQQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV 
As Brody contends, by not creating its own labor party, organized American labor 
DFFRPPRGDWHGLWVHOI³WRD VHFRQGDU\SODFH´DVUHJDUGVpolitical life as well as a more limited 
³FRQWUROOLQJIRUFHZLWKLQWKH'HPRFUDWLFSDUW\´)URPWKDWPRPHQWRQZDUGLQ:DOWHU
RHXWKHU¶VRZQZRUGVWKHODERUPRYHPHQWKDGWRIXOILOOLWVSROLWLFDOGHVWLQ\ZLWKLQD
Democratic party that served as the American equivalent of a European social-democratic 
party (Brody, 1993: 199, 218, 238). 
:DOWHU5HXWKHUZDVQ¶WRQO\LQYROYHGLQWKHGLVFussion of a new American labor party that 
could act as a vehicle for bringing into reach a welfare state in the U.S. He was also the most 
outspoken labor leader in post-war America who tried to further concretize and subsequently, 
to implement this ideal. 
Earlier, during the war, the CIO already propagated a social agenda not only encompassing 
wage bargaining, but also the political planning of the economy and a further expansion of the 
corporatist New Deal welfare state. The objective was to give organized ODERUDYRLFHLQ³WKH
SURGXFWLRQJRDOVLQYHVWPHQWGHFLVLRQVDQGHPSOR\PHQWSDWWHUQVRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VFRUH
LQGXVWULHV´/LFKWHQVWHLQ'XULQJWKHZDURUJDQL]HGODERUKDGJDLQHGH[SHULHQFH
with tripartite corporatist bargaining and negotiating in the important War Labor Board. The 
tripartite WLB had set a national wage policy during the war. In the wake of this experience 
CIO-president Philip Murray put forward the so-called Industry Council Plan, which 
SURSDJDWHG³WKHIXVLRQRIHFRQRPLFDQGSROLtical bargaining at the very highest levels of 
LQGXVWU\JRYHUQDQFH´/LFKWHQVWHLQ 
:DOWHU5HXWKHU¶VRZQLGHDOZDVµLQGXVWULDORUHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\¶6HH%R\OH
Brinkley, 1995; Brinkley, 1998; Lichtenstein, 1989; Lichtenstein, 1995; Lichtenstein 2002). 
By this he meant a sort of a welfare state characterized by planning of the national economy 
and the creation of a situation of full employment. 
%DVHGRQ0XUUD\¶V,QGXVWU\&RXQFLO3ODQ5HXWKHULQSURSRVHGDWULSDUWLWH$LUFUDIW
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ProdXFWLRQ%RDUG7KLV%RDUG³ZRXOGKDYHWKHSRZHUWRUHRUJDQL]HSURGXFWLRQIDFLOLWLHV
without regard for corporate boundaries, markets or personnel. It would conscript labor and 
work space where and when needed and secure for the UAW at least a veto over a wide range 
RIPDQDJHULDOIXQFWLRQV´/LFKWHQVWHLQ 
5HXWKHU¶VLQVSLUDWLRQFDPHSDUWO\IURPSODQQLQJH[SHULHQFHVGXULQJWKHSUH-war New Deal 
with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) entailing dam-construction and flood control in 
the Tennessee RivHULQWKH6RXWK7KHRWKHUKDOIRI5HXWKHU¶VLQVSLUDWLRQFDPHODWHUIURP
)UDQFH¶VSRVW-war experience with planning the national French economy by the important so-
FDOOHGµ&RPPLVVDULDW*HQHUDOGX3ODQ¶7KH&RPPLVVDULDWRSHUDWHGFORVHWRWKH)UHQch prime 
minister and made four-year plans for the development of the French economy.    
In fact, Walter Reuther propagated a corporatist middle ground or third way between private 
property interests and public interests. The TVA-concept should be applied to creating public 
corporations in basic key industries. Planning could take the form of smaller planning boards 
responsible for production quantities and pricing, with which the World War I and World War 
II Wilson- and Roosevelt-administrations already had gained experience. 
As a result, an important part of power was taken away from private corporations in favor of 
the common good. As Reuther contended, a planned economy ³ZRXOGEHJLQWKHEUeaking 
GRZQRIQDUURZIL[HGHFRQRPLFSUHVVXUHJURXSV«DQGEHJLQWRGUDZLnto active 
participation of all those elements whose welfare is affected by the over-all economic pattern 
HVWDEOLVKHG´FLW%R\OH 
,QVXP5HXWKHU¶VLGHDVDUHLQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWKZKDWLVFDOOHGµVRFLDO.H\QHVLDQLVP¶7KLVLV
primarily a social-democratic vision, which aligns with the ideas behind the first New Deal 
period between 1932 and 1934. 
Social Keynesianism was directed at stimulating economic growth to levels that would only 
allow low levels of unemployment (Brinkley, 1998: 96). As Brinkley contends, behind social 
Keynesianism existed at the time a broad coalition of economists, union leaders, agricultural 
activists, consumer groups and others that ultimately led to the Employment Act of 1946. The 
preceding Full Employment Bill of 1945 still contained the idea of national economic 
SODQQLQJ³WRHQVXUHDMREIRUHYHU\$PHULFDQ´%R\OH7KHXOWLPDWH$FWGLGQ¶W
have this clause. Conservative Democrats from the South, the so-called Dixiecrats, opposed 
the idea of planning the economy. Additionally, an important battle surged between two 
JURXSVRIUHIRUPHUVWKHµVRFLDORUUHJXODWRU\.H\QHVLDQV¶DQGWKHµFRPPHUFLDO.H\QHVLDQV¶
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The last group, consisting of a new generation of progressive New Dealers, also disliked the 
idea of industrial democracy and abstained from the idea that the state should control and 
regulate the corporations. Instead, they preferred indirect fiscal stimulation of the economy 
and stimulation of private consumption, which would turn out being substantially less 
threatening to private property. Brinkley contends that in their view the state had already 
VXFFHHGHGVXIILFLHQWO\LQUHJXODWLQJHPSOR\HU¶VEHKDYLRUWKURXJKWKHUHJXODWRU\LQLWLDWLYHV
and labor law in the 1930s, such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) and the 
National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act). Instead, the remaining flaws of capitalism had to 
EHVROYHGWKURXJKH[SDQGHGZHOIDUHVRFLDOLQVXUDQFHDQGILVFDOSROLFLHV³WKHWDVNZDVWR
build not a corporate state, not a regulatory state, buWDFRPSHQVDWRU\VWDWH´%ULQNOH\
92).   
This idea was translated into the so-called Fair Deal, thHµQHZOLEHUDOUHIRUPVDJHQGD¶of 
president Harry Truman and the Democratic party, consisting of a broad pallet of reform 
LQWHQWLRQVVXFKDV³WKHH[Sansion of social security, the creation of national health insurance, 
WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRISXEOLFKRXVLQJWKHSURWHFWLRQRIWKHFRQVXPHU´%ULQNOH\
Boyle argues that the new liberal agenda became the dominant force in the American political 
discourse in the years to come, whereas the social democratic agenda of the Social 
Keynesians, including the UAW and Walter Reuther, became less influential in American 
politics (Boyle, 1995: 60). Nevertheless, Reuther cum suis largely remained stuck in the 
social democratic agenda, with as its core idea the creation of economic democracy in the 
U.S. Time and again, he and the UAW would try to realize parts of this agenda.  Walter 
Reuther continued to play an important role with respect to Democratic legislative initiatives 
³IURPWKH(PSOR\PHQW$FWLQWRWKH*UHDW6RFLHW\3URJUDPVRIWKHPLGV´DQGE\
WU\LQJWR³EXLOGDFURVV-FODVVELUDFLDOUHIRUPFRDOLWLRQ´%R\OH-5). 
All in all, neither the idea of a corporatist welfare state in the U.S. nor 5HXWKHU¶VLGHDRI
economic or industrial democracy received much or lasting support from the Democratic 
Party in the first post-war years. Commercial Keynesianism defeated social Keynesianism. 
Moreover, big strikes in the car industry in 1946 and 1948 quickly taught the UAW that 
crossing the border of management prerogatives, such as deciding about product pricing, 
market allocation and job-control caused immense difficulties for the trade union. This was 
reinforced further by the implementation of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. This Act limited a 
number of important labor rights that were regulated in the New Deal Wagner Act. Most 
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important were:  the ban on foreman unionism, the ban on secondary boycotts, and the ban on 
the closed union shop (Lichtenstein, 1989: 134). One of its consequences was also the purge 
of communists from union posts (Lichtenstein, 2002: 115). 
5.2 From the Great Society towards the breakdown of union power 
American post-war liberalism has had two high points. The first one was the onset of the New 
Deal welfare state during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt and its direct aftermath in 
the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s. The second was the period of the Great Society 
programs of President L.B. Johnson in the 1960s. 
In between, there were the Republican presidency of President Dwight Eisenhower and the 
Democratic Presidency of John F. Kennedy. Eisenhower cherished the maintenance of the 
New Deal welfare state, but kept it at bay (Boyle, 1995: 85). And Kennedy was not 
particularly sensitive to further social reforms.  
From February 1950 the rise of McCarthyism also influenced progressive politics in a 
negative sense. It made continuous social reform a suspect affair for a while. According to 
Boyle McCarthyism made reformers more reluctant to promote further labor-friendly reforms. 
More importantly, it shifted the vital political center to the right until the advent of Lyndon B. 
-RKQVRQ¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQLQ%R\OH7KHPHUJHUEHWZHHQWKHWZRIHGHUDWHG
national trade unions AFL and CIO in 1955, intended to reinforce the political power and 
influence of reformers on the union VLGHFRXOGQ¶WFKDQJHWKLVGHYHORSPHQW$WWKHVDPHWLPH, 
a new issue manifested itself on the political agenda that eventually would split the 
progressive forces in American society. This was the issue of civil rights and race. This issue, 
focused on equal rights of both colored people and gender, would almost completely overrule 
the then dominant class-based labor problem in a limited number of years. The attention of 
the Democratic Party shifted likewise. The civil rights question would also exert a strong 
influence RQ-RKQVRQ¶V*UHDWSociety reform programs.  
If he wanted to maintain sufficient (political) support for his social-democratic agenda the 
DSSDUHQWODFNRIVXSSRUWRISUHVLGHQW.HQQHG\IRUVRFLDOUHIRUPVXUJHG8$:¶VSUHVLGHQW
:DOWHU5HXWKHUWRORRNIRURWKHUDOOLHV³RXWVLGHWKHWUDGLWLRQDOSROLF\ERXQGDULHVEH\RQGWKH
White House, beyond the halls of Congress, beyond Americans for Democratic Action and 
WKH'HPRFUDWLFSDUW\´%R\OH+HIRXQGWKHPLQWKHFLYLOULJKWVPRYHPHQWPRUH
in particular in the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
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and the leftist student organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In August 1963 
the UAW even merged with the NAACP during the March on Washington. As Boyle argues, 
WKH8$:WKHFLYLOULJKWVPRYHPHQWDQGWKH6'6VXFFHHGHGLQFUHDWLQJDµJUDQG¶UHIRUP
coalition, pushing into the center of public debate the crucial question of racial inequality and 
IXUWKHUVRFLDOUHIRUPVDIWHU.HQQHG\¶VDVVDVVLQDWLRQLQ1RYHPEHU%R\OH-
184). 
It is important to realize that in the beginning of the 1960s the economic situation in the U.S. 
was radically different from the disastrous economic situation in the 1930s. Prosperity had 
increased enormously in the postwar years and the American economy was doing very well 
when Johnson became president of the U.S. In principle, a lot of public money was available 
at the time for reform programs that could contribute to solving long-time social problems, 
such as civil rights, race and poverty. Moreover, it was assumed that affluence and economic 
growth had become lasting and that in this context social engineering could solve all 
remaining social ills7KHDFFRPSDQ\LQJSKLORVRSK\ZDVµPDQDJHULDOOLEHUDOLVP¶ZKLFKZRXOG
further erode the earlier more far-UHDFKLQJµVRFLDO-GHPRFUDWLFOLEHUDOLVP¶WKDW Walter Reuther 
propagated. To President Johnson managerial liberalism implied an active top-down role of 
government primarily directed at fine-tuning the economy and economic growth in order to 
³SURGXFHJURZWKGLYLGHQGRIVXUSOXVIXQGVWRLQLWLDWHUHIRUPV´$QGUHZ 
As a result, in the fall of 1966 Johnson had proposed 200 major pieces of legislation of which 
Congress had approved 181 entailing civil rights, poverty, education, health, housing, 
pollution, the arts, cities, occupational safety, and consumer protection (Andrew, 1998: 13; 
see also Davies, 1996). 
Because of this, rather soon the Great Society programs got the image of a large bureaucratic 
monster. At the same time, because of its accent on civil rights and race, the Great Society 
raised the criticism and resentment of the Republicans, employers and the white working 
class. For them, the political and social reforms too one-sidedly benefited the black population 
of the U.S. 
For example, one of the key programs of the Great Society, the War on Poverty, mainly 
consisting of work-training programs for the unemployed and community action programs, 
turned out to become highly controversial despite its successes in reducing substantially the 
poverty rate in the U.S. with about six million Americans between 1964 and 19696 (Andrew, 
                                                                                                                    
6  Which  in  fact  implied  a  drop  in  the  poverty  rate  from  17  to  12  percent  of  the  American  population  (Andrew,  
1998:  187).  
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1998: 87). The War on Poverty was largely focused on urban African-Americans and 
WKHUHIRUHLJQRUHGWKHQHHGVRIWKHXUEDQZKLWHZRUNLQJFODVV$VDFRQVHTXHQFH³ZLWKLQD
few years white workers would turn against the Great Society and the president who had 
FUHDWHGLW´%R\OH But also the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
was against the War on Poverty and its background philosophy of eradicating poverty by 
expensive work programs. Instead, the NAM favored its traditional hobbyhorses, such as 
reducing taxes, cutting public spending and reducing labor power (Andrew, 1998: 67). 
After 1966 political support for the Great Society eroded rather quickly due to several 
reasons. Important was the white backlash, which had split Democratic constituencies. But 
apart from that, opposition of the Republicans, the employers, the New Left, and academics 
played a role. Finally, President Johnson himself was forced to move his priorities toward the 
Vietnam War. 
Assessing in hindsight the gains DQGORVVHVRI-RKQVRQ¶V*UHDWSociety, one of its architects 
Patrick Daniel Moynihan concluded it was D³ORVWRSSRUWXQLW\´%XWDV.DW]QHOVRQDUJXHV
succinctly, there was much more at stake (Katznelson, 1989: 185-211). In his view the Great 
Society was not just a missed opportunity toward a next step in the historical evolution of 
social reform in the U.S. On the contrary, it is best seen as a part of a larger framework of 
postwar reforms starting in the 1940s that undercut, instead of reinforcing, the prospects for 
American social-democratic politics (Katznelson, 1995: 187). In that sense, it also contributed 
substantially to the collapse of organized labor as a social-democratic force. 
Henry Aaron, a Brookings Institute economist, explains the ultimate eclipse of the Great 
Society not as primarily caused by intrinsic factors, but first and foremost by external 
developments, such as the Vietnam War, the dissolution of the civil rights movement and the 
Watergate scandal (Aaron, 1978). 
Having said this, it is obvious that the Great Society marked the end of several decades of 
post-New Deal reforms. It also implied the eclipse of the idea of industrial democracy or 
economic democracy as advocated E\8$:¶VSUHVLGHQW:DOWHU5HXWKHU$IWHUODFNRIVXSSRUW
of presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, initially Johnson was very much in favor of the idea 
of economic planning. From the onset of his presidency Walter Reuther was on very good 
personal terms with the President for some time and was also regularly consulted by Johnson. 
Yet in the 1964 State of the Union the president echoed many of the UAW policy priorities by 
SOHDGLQJIRU³DQHFRQRP\RIRSSRUWXQLW\´DOORZLQJ³WKH\RXQJWKHROGPHPEHUVRIPLQRULW\
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JURXSVWKHLPSRYHULVKHGWKHXQHPSOR\HGWKHSHRSOHRIGHSUHVVHGDUHDV«WRFRQWULEXWH
constructively, to the maximum of their respective capacities, to the progress of the nation and 
WRVKDUHHTXLWDEO\LQWKHDEXQGDQFHZKLFKWKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQFDQKHOSWRFUHDWH´FLW%R\OH
1995: 183).   
After Lyndon B. Johnson left the White House in the spring of 1968 the Great Society 
gradually came under further attack, in particular from the conservative side. This was 
undergirded by a conservative change in the mood of the American population, the pivotal 
role race played in the accomplishment of the Great Society and the confusion of culture and 
cultural politics with issues of economics and class (Andrew, 1998: 184). 
In this light, the 1970s can be viewed as the aftermath of several decades of progressive 
liberalism and liberal consensus. Recently, Cowie has best analyzed this decade. By 
describing extensively the further fragmentation of the American working class, the shift of 
support of the white working class from the Democratic party towards president Richard 
Nixon and the Conservative party as well as the decline of the trade unions, Cowie argues that 
the 1970s marked the end of a political order, the end of a movement and the end of an era. 
%XW³PRVWRIDOOLWZDVWKHHQGRIDKLVWRULFDOO\HOXVLYHLGHDOWKHFRQVFLRXVGLYHUVHDQG
unified working class acting as a powerful agent in political, social and economLFOLIH´
(Cowie, 2010: 369).  
Cowie divides this decade into two periods. The first period from 1968-1974 is marked by a 
high strike incidence, such as the memorable VWULNHLQ*0¶V&KHYUROHW9HJDSODQWLQ 
Lordstown, Ohio. This strike once again taught the UAW that the management prerogative of 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHSURGXFWLRQFRXOGQ¶WEHGHQLHG$OVRWKHSDVVDJHRIWKH/DQGUXP-
Griffin Act (1959) providing federal supervision of unions in order to protect workers from 
communism and corruption proved to be important in this period and particularly benefited 
the employers. However, most important in the first half of the 1970s was the clash between 
WKH1HZOHIWDQGRUJDQL]HGODERUDVZHOODV5LFKDUG1L[RQ¶V success in transforming the until 
then dominant materialist concept of workers and working class into a cultural concept, in 
which national pride prevailed over class conflict (Cowie, 2010: 68-74, 164-165). 
The second period, between 1974-1982 was covered by the Democratic Carter presidency and 
the conservative Reagan presidency. This period was marked by a number of failed labor law 
reforms, such as the Humphrey-Hawkins Full Employment Bill, as well as by a revival of 
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business power. The powerful Business Round table7, consisting of big American 
corporations including GM was established and successfully blocked the AFL-CIO struggle to 
let pass labor law reforms. The Business Round Table also created the Labor Law Study 
Committee and the March Group. The Labor Law Study Committee tried to reduce organized 
ODERU¶VLQIOXHQFHE\FRPLQJXSZLWKDOWHUQDWLYHUHIRUPSURSRVDOVZKHUHDVWKH0DUFK*URXS¶s 
first objective was trying to improve the damaged image of big business in politics and the 
media. All came to climax in 1978.  That year EHFDPHD³:DWHUORRIRUXQLRQVUHJXODWRUV
Keynesian tax rHIRUPHUV´&RZLH 
5.3 Summary and conclusions 
Ultimately, in the period 1945-RUJDQL]HGODERULQWKH86GLGQ¶WVXFFHHGLQUHDOL]LQJLWV
objective of economic democracy that would have enabled the development of an American 
social-democratic welfare state. What is more, by the end of the period in 1980, organized 
labor had lost completely its privileged position in American politics.  
In this chapter, the focus has been on the role of politics. After initial hesitations in the 1930s 
and 1940s AFL-CIO and the UAW embraced the Democratic Party as its coalition partner. 
However, by the time this happened, the Democratic Party had already made a major shift 
from Social Keynesianism towards Commercial Keynesianism. As a consequence, the 
Democratic Party no longer wanted to change the capitalist order to reach its goals. This 
culminated in the so-called managerial liberalism of the Johnson era, entailing an active top-
down social-economic policy of the government directed at economic growth and solving the 
remaining social ills in the U.S., mainly racism, poverty and unemployment. 
On top of the move towards managerial liberalism, from the mid 1960s, the Democratic Party 
shifted its attention from the labor question and class politics to race and civil rights. 
Although Walter Reuther also had played an active and a decisive role in this shift of attention 
by building an early cross-class, biracial coalition with the civil rights movement and the New 
Left, in the end this turned out to have been contra-productive to the AFL-CIO and the UAW. 
Not in the least, because a large group of white rank and file members of the UAW and other 
unions were against equal treatment of blacks and whites in the workplace. Furthermore, by 
its focus on race and civil rights in the wake of the Great Society reform programs, the 
                                                                                                                    
7  About  the  role  and    influence  of  business  interest  groups  such  as  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  
(NAM),  the  U.S.  Chamber  of  Commerce  and  the  Business  Round  Table  see  also  more  extensively  Chapter  6  and  
more  in  particular,  Paragraph  6.3.  
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Democratic Party estranged itself from the white working class.  
)LQDOO\µQHZXQLRQLVP¶VKLSZUHFNHG$QLQWULJXLQJTXestion in this respect remains whether 
WKHWUDGHXQLRQPRYHPHQWLQWKHVDQGVKDGRSWHGIRUDµWKLUG¶ODERUSDUW\, the 
GHVWLQ\RIµHFRQRPLFGHPRFUDF\¶LQ$PHULFDZRXOGKDYHEHHQGLIIHUHQW 
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6. The battle of job control 
In this chapter, I shift my focus to the eternal battle between management, unions and workers 
for job control. In Par 6.1, I describe the development and significance of so-called welfare 
capitalism, which mainly took shape in non-unionized companies in the U.S. After World 
War II, welfare capitalism gradually evolved into personnel management and human 
resources management. Welfare capitalism was an alternative to trade unionism for 
employers. Subsequently, in Par. 6.2, I will return to the national level by describing the role 
and significance of the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB was created as the 
administrative body of the Wagner Act and its main task was settling timely breaks of the 
Wagner Act, either by employers or workers. With some notable exceptions, it will turn out 
that the NLRB from the onset played a crucial role with respect to taming union power. 
In Par. 6.3, partly also devoted to the national level, I will describe and analyze the role and 
significance of management prerogatives as well as the role of business interest and lobby 
groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM). Business interest and 
lobby groups intentionally tried to limit union power by administering a twofold strategy. 
This strategy consisted of influencing directly the law-making process of Government and 
Congress and in addition, of scrupulously watching over management prerogatives. 
6.1 Welfare capitalism and personnel management versus bargaining policies 
The pre-eminent example of successful postwar bargaining policies of trade unions in the U.S. 
until the 1980s was definitely General Motors. As I described elsewhere, the UAW realized a 
fully-fledged private welfare state with all kinds of mainly material provisions inside this 
company (De Gier, 2010). However, as tKLVSDUDJUDSKZLOOPDNHFOHDU8$:¶VEDUJDLQLQJ
successes also contained a shadow side, which in the end contributed to the decline of the 
trade union movement in the U.S., and more in particular also to the waning of power of the 
UAW at both the national level and the industry and company level. 
Before the surge of union power in the 1930s and the 1940s, organized labor was rather weak 
in the U.S. and with some notable exceptions, such as during and in the wake of World War I, 
GLGQ¶WSOD\DYHU\RXWVSRNHQ role at the company level.  
Traditionally, in the American factory system of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century the foreman played a decisive role. The foreman disposed of great decision latitude 
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and could hire and fire workers almost autonomously and also decide about work speed. 
Accordingly, the central company management remained at a distance from the shop floor. 
From the 1880s onward this started to change, firstly with the initiation of welfare work and 
later, as a corollary, from the 1920s, with the creation of personnel departments in large 
companies. Personnel departments would eventually break the powers of the foreman and 
take over his tasks with respect to hiring and firing personnel. Although welfare work or 
welfare capitalism was not exclusively American, nowadays it still plays a pre-eminent role in 
American industrial relations DV³PRGHUQZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVP´-DFRE\ 
One of the authors, who investigated welfare capitalism extensively for the first time, defined 
it as³DQ\VHUYLFHSURYLGHGIRUWKHFRPIRUWRULPSURYHPHQWRIHPSOR\HHVZKLFKZDVQHLWKHUD
QHFHVVLW\RIWKHLQGXVWU\QRUUHTXLUHGE\ODZ´$VVXFKZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVPFDQEHVHHQDVDQ
alternative to trade unions, offered by company management (Brandes, 1976: 5-6). 
From a substantive viewpoint welfare capitalism encompassed the following fields: housing, 
education, religion, recreation, profit sharing and stock ownership plans, medical care, 
pensions, social work and employee representation. 
Moriguchi, in a more recent publication, boils down welfare capitalism to the following three 
categories: 
DWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRISHFXQLDU\LQFHQWLYHFRQWUDFWVWKDWZHUHFRQWLQJHQWRQHPSOR\HHV¶ILUP-
specific tenure and other desirable characteristics, such as merit, workmanship, and loyalty 
(for example: retirement pension, employee stock ownership, life and health insurance, paid 
vacation and housing plans); 
(b) investments in the human capital of blue-collar employees, such as training programs, 
employee magazines, and health and safety education; 
(c) personnel programs to provide internal contract enforcement, such as recreational facilities 
(Moriguchi, 2003: 5-6). 
Brody, finally, also reduces the wide array of welfare work programs to three categories: 
schemes to encourage men to acquire property, such as savings plans, home-ownership plans 
and stock-purchasing plans; programs to protect workmen and their families from losses 
resulting from accident, illness, old age and death; and finally, employee representation which 
BURG\HVWLPDWHVDVWKH³PRVWFHOHEUDWHGODERUH[SHULPHQWRIWKHGHFDGH´%URG\-
55). 
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Welfare work reached its peak during the 1920s. In this decade it obviously offered an 
alternative to trade unionism. The number of strikes was rather low and less than a third if 
compared with the number of strikes occurring just before World War I (Brandes, 1976: 136). 
Also, the level of union membership dropped substantially in this period. 
Sumner H. Slichter considered welfare work in 1929 as one of the most ambitious social 
experiments of tKDWWLPH³EHFDXVH>LWDLPV@«to counteract the effect of modern techniques 
upon the mind of the worker, to prevent him from coming class conscious and from 
oUJDQL]LQJWUDGHXQLRQV´Schlichter, 1929: 432). He discerned six methods: helping 
employees acquire property, helping workers acquirH³DVWDNH´LQWKHHQWHUSULVHprotecting 
workers against arbitrary treatment, rewarding continuity of service, giving workers the 
opportunity to advance to more responsible positions, and giving workers security. As a 
consequence, between 1922-1929, production increased spectacularly, union membership 
dropped substantially, the number of strikes decreased significantly, and turnover of labor 
lowered (Schlichter, 1929: 404).  
Clearly, welfare work can be seen as a union evasive strategy. By introducing welfare 
capitalism in a company, management mostly successfully succeeded in keeping out the trade 
unions. On the other hand, welfare capitalism also contained a moral dimension. Many 
experts considered it a paternalistic employer policy, which in a number of cases also implied 
strict control of the worker outside the company premises.  
Brandes as well as others describe one of the first examples of welfare work in the U.S. This 
was the creation of the new company town of Pullman, Illinois in 1880 by the railroad car 
FRPSDQ\ZLWKWKHVDPHQDPH3XOOPDQZDQWHGWRSUHYHQWVWULNHVDQGDOVR³WRH[FOXGHDOO
EDQHIXOLQIOXHQFHV´%UDQGHVVHHRQWKHSKHQRPHQRQRIFRPSDQ\WRZQV*UHHQ
2010). Apart from decent housing, Pullman offered supplementary welfare services to its 
workers, such as education and ordered surroundings. Many other companies followed 
3XOOPDQ¶VH[DPSOH 
As has been argued, union evasion was an important motive for employers to introduce 
welfare capitalism. That was also the case with respect to the moral dimension. Some 
HPSOR\HUVOLNH3XOOPDQSURSDJDWHGWKHFUHDWLRQRIDXWRSLDQ³1HZ&DSLWDOLVW0DQ´DVRUWRI
$PHULFDQPRGHOZRUNHUZKRZRXOGEH³WKULIW\FOHDQWHPSHUDWHLQtelligent, and especially 
LQGXVWULRXVDQGOR\DO´%UDQGHV, 33).  
A third motive was provided by economic and demographic developments. The rapid 
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industrialization of America required many workers. This generated big waves of immigrants 
who had tREHµ$PHULFDQL]HG¶ILUVWEHIRUHWKH\ZHUHVXLWHGWRZRUNLQWKHJURZLQJ
companies. This entailed, for instance, the creation of English learning facilities and the 
construction of churches. The companies themselves organized all this. 
Taken together, in the 1920s a large part of the big American companies had their own 
welfare capitalist programs. And it seemed that despite critical attitudes, many workers 
embraced welfare capitalism (Brody, 1993: 48-81: Cohen, 1990). From this perspective, at 
that specific moment, a surge of power of organized labor, as occurred later on in the wake of 
the New Deal, seemed highly unrealistic.   
However, the economic crisis of 1929 and the subsequent Great Depression made at least a 
provisional end to welfare capitalist programs of the majority of the big American Companies 
and induced a rapid and huge increase of union power. 
In the context of this paper it is relevant to pay some attention to the assessment, by industrial 
relations experts and labor historians, of the historic significance of welfare capitalism. 
Its most extensive empirical evaluator, Stuart D. Brandes, considers welfare capitalism as it 
PDQLIHVWHGLWVHOIEHIRUHWKH*UHDW'HSUHVVLRQDVD³WHPSRUDU\H[SHGLHQW´DQGDVDQ³LQWHULP
VROXWLRQ´+HFRQWHQGV³:KHQ American workers were finally given an unfettered 
opportunity - as they were during the New Deal - they shunned welfare capitalism in favor of 
XQLRQLVP7RWKHLUFUHGLWWKH\RSWHGIRULQGXVWULDOGHPRFUDF\´%UDQGHV
This was reinforced, so Brandes arguesE\³JRYHUQPHQWGLVWDVWHIRUVRPHNLQGVRIZHOIDUH
FDSLWDOLVP´DVH[SUHVVHGE\WKHFUXFLDO6HFWLRQDRIWKH1DWLRQDO,QGXVWULDO5HFRYHU\$FW
1,5$VWDWLQJWKDW³HPSOR\HHVVKDOOKDYHWKHULJKWWRRUJDQL]HDQGEDUJDLQFROOHFWLYHO\
through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, 
UHVWUDLQWRUFRHUFLRQRIHPSOR\HUV«LQWKHGHVLJQDWLRQRIVXFKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVHWF´
(Brandes, 1976: 143).  
Also Irving Bernstein talks about welfare capitalism as a transitLRQDOVWDJH³:HOIDUH
capitalism, stripped of the verbiage of industrial democracy, was precisely what its critics 
called it: paternalism. At best it could be more than an unstable system for both employer and 
HPSOR\HHDWUDQVLWLRQDOVWDJH«´%HUQVWHLQ1960: 186). 
More positive about the (continuing) significance of welfare capitalism for American 
industrial and labor relations are David Brody, Lizabeth Cohen, Elizabeth Fones-Wolf, H.M. 
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Gitelman and Sanford M. Jacoby (Brody, 1993; Cohen, 1990; Fones-Wolf, 1986: Gitelman, 
1992; Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby, 1997; Jacoby, 2004, Jacoby, 2005: 78-100).  
Brody contends that in the 1920s welfare capitalism had succeeded in winning the support of 
most workers, but that eventually the Great Depression killed welfare capitalism. If the Great 
'HSUHVVLRQKDGQ¶WRFFXUUHG³WKHSDWHUQDOLVWLFFRXUVHRI$PHULFDQLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQVPLJKW
ZHOOKDYHFRQWLQXHG«´%URG\7RVRPHH[WHQW%URG\KDVEHHQULJKWLQKLV
estimation. If we look at the figures, in particular large companies introduced welfare work 
programs and industrial relations departments. By the end of the 1920s approximately half of 
the companies employing more than 2000 workers had a personnel department, whereas this 
was the case with only 6.5 percent of companies employing less than 500 workers. On the 
other hand, the National Industrial Conference Board reported almost at the same time that 
more than ninety percent of the companies surveyed administered safety programs; seventy 
percent operated group insurance; sixty percent, mutual aid associations; and twenty percent, 
formal loan plans, stock purchase opportunities, or savings and loan facilities (Brody, 1993: 
59-60).  
According to Brandes, in 1926, about eighty percent of the large American companies had 
adopted at least one form of welfare capitalism. This implied more than four million workers 
at the time (Brandes, 1976: 28). Finally, also Jacoby argues that welfare capitalism was an 
influential movement for the first three decades of the 20th century, encompassing in the 
VPLOOLRQVRIZRUNHUVDQGWKRXVDQGVRIILUPV:HOIDUHFDSLWDOLVPZDVQ¶WRQO\HPEUDFHG
by employers, but also by numerous workers as well as by intellectuals and social reformers, 
such as the philosopher John Dewey, management theorist Mary Parker Follet and the Taylor 
Society8. Therefore, it can also be considered as a distinctive American approach. That is, 
³SULYDWHQRWJRYHUQPHQWDODQGPDQDJHULDOQRWODERULVW´-DFRE\ 
As early as1904 employers created a committee on welfare work, mainly consisting of anti-
union employers. In 1911, this committee represented more than 500 leading employers and 
public officials. It got also support from the AFL until the outbreak of World War I (Brandes, 
                                                                                                                    
8  According  to  Jacoby,  the  Taylor  Society  (originally  the  Society  for  the  promotion  of  Scientific  Management)  
had  been  a  hotbed  of  liberal  corporatism  since  1915.  Taken  over  by  progressive  engineers,  the  Taylor  Society  
͞ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂĨĂƐĐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇǁĂƐƚŚĞŬĞǇƚŽŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ͘ŽŵƉĂŶǇ
unions,  works  councils,  and  employee  participation  in  time  studies  were  justified  as  ƐƚŝŵƵůĂŶƚƐƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ͟
;:ĂĐŽďǇ͕ϭϵϵϳ͗͟ϭϳ͖:ĂĐŽďǇ͕ϭϵϴϯ͗ϭϴ-­‐33).  About  the  rivalry  and  trade-­‐off  between  Taylorism  and  Welfare  Work  
at  the  company  level,  see:  Nelson,  1972:  1-­‐16.  According  to  Nelson  a  process  of  accommodating  Taylorism  and  
Welfare  Work  had  gotten  underway  since  World  War  I.  
    
35  
1976: 23). In 1916, employers were also represented extensively in the Committee on Welfare 
and Work, which was related to the Council of National Defense, established by Congress. 
7KHREMHFWLYHRIWKLVFRPPLWWHHZDV³WREULQJKRPHWRHPSOR\HUVLQWKHPRVWIRUFHIXOZD\
the necessity of establishing correct standards, in the end that the Government will receive 
from the industries, the best possible results and at the same time conserve the health and 
HIILFLHQF\RIWKHZRUNLQJSRSXODWLRQ´%UDQGHV 
Finally, in the 1920s the Special Conference Committee (SCC) organized the core of the large 
companies, including GM and US Steel with respect to welfare capitalism. This committee 
advocated the so-FDOOHG³$PHULFDQ3ODQ´WRD large extent identical to welfare capitalist 
programs, but also at the same time with a strong inclination to shun trade unionism (Brody, 
1997: 21-25; see about the American Plan also Bernstein, 1960; Fraser, 1991). 
In accordance with Brody, also Lizabeth Cohen in her study on industrial workers in Chicago, 
1919-1939, contends that welfare capitalism conquered the hearts of industrial workers, 
particularly in the 1920s until the outbreak of the Great Depression in 1929 and the early 
1930s (Cohen, 1990: 159-211). But even after the crumbling of the majority of capitalist 
welfare capitalist programs brought about by the Great Depression many workers retained 
their confidence in welfare capitalism.  
Cohen makes an important distinction between welfare capitalism before and after World War 
I. Before this war, she argues, the significance of welfare work was limited. This was caused 
by the ongoing dominant position on the shop floor of the foreman, combined with the lasting 
IDFWRU\RU³GULYHV\VWHP´on the origins of the factory system see: Nelson, 1975). The drive 
system implied close supervision of the foreman, and likewise abuse, profanity and threats 
and perpetuated itself in a situation of unstable and unpredictable employment conditions. As 
-DFRE\DUJXHV³WKHZRUNHU¶VHFRQRPLFVXFFHVVDQGMREVDWLVIDFWion depended on a highly 
personal relationship with his foreman, with management and the company playing only a 
PLQRUUROH´Brody, 2004: 13-18; also Schlichter, 1929: 393-435; Lichtenstein, 2002: 121-
122).  
After the Great War larger employers, such as International Harvester, Swift Armour, US 
6WHHODQG&KLFDJR¶VODUJHVWHPSOR\HUWKH+DZWKRUQH:RUNVRI:HVWHUQ(OHFWULFUHFRJQL]HG
the significance of human relations and took seriously worker complaints for the first time in 
history. In this respect, World War I operated as a sea change with regard to industrial 
relations and more in particular to the dominant managerial ideology. In order to establish 
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welfare capitalism after World War I, Chicagoan employers tried to dismantle as quick as 
possible the powerful and apparently untouchable position of foremen on the shop floor. 
Although the new welfare capitalist programs still contained many flaws and remained 
contested to some extent by workers, employers, nevertheless, succeeded in gaining 
sustainable worker support. As a result, the enlightened corporation arose. This implied that 
IURPWKHQRQWKH³HQOLJKWHQHGFRUSRUDWLRQQRWWKHODERUXQLRQRUWKHVWDWHZRXOGVSHDUKHDG
the creation of a more benign industrial VRFLHW\´&RKHQ,Q the end, enlightened 
LQGXVWULDOHPSOR\HUV³SURYLGHGZRUNHUVZLWKDQHZVHWRIVWDQGDUGVIRUHYDOXDWLQJDJRRGMRE
VWHDG\ZRUNKLJKZDJHVRSSRUWXQLW\IRUDGYDQFHPHQWGHFHQWFRQGLWLRQVJHQHURXVEHQHILWV´
(Cohen, 1990: 206).  
Elizabeth Fones-Wolf also disputes the death of welfare capitalism during the Great 
Depression. Although the depression years brought about major changes to welfare work, she 
argues that these by no means ended it entirely, despite serious financial setbacks and 
industrial union successes. 
By the HQGRI:RUOG:DU,,VKHFRQWHQGV³DVRSKLVWLFDWHGV\VWHPRIHPSOR\HU-controlled 
welfarism had regained legitimacy and proved successful in helping stifle a postwar 
UHVXUJHQFH´,QSDUWLFXODUODUJHFRPSDQLHVVXFKDV*HQHUDO(OHFWULF*(*0DQG,%0
helped reviving welfare capitalism after World War II.  (Fones-Wolf, 1986: 232). Positive 
experiences with recreational programs during the war played an important role. Taken 
together, in 1954 industry spent approximately 20 perFHQWRIHPSOR\HUV¶SD\UROOV for 
nonwage incentives, such as pensions, child care, group insurance, improved working 
conditions, educational assistance, vacations and recreational programs. By 1980 this had 
LQFUHDVHGWRSHUFHQW1RUGLGHPSOR\HUV¶PRWLYHV differ fundamentally from pre-war 
motives, that is: gaining greater productivity, gaining employee loyalty, higher morale and 
undermining unionism (Fones-Wolf, 1986: 256). 
In a critical argumentation H.M. Gitelman concludes that after temporary retreat welfare 
capitalist programs survived the Great Depression, albeit in a transformed way. Based on 
figures, collected by the Conference Board among 2454 companies in 1927 and subsequently 
in 1935, nine of on the whole twelve welfare capitalist activities expanded in 1935 and three 
contracted. For example, employee representation, group/health insurance, group life 
insurance and saving plans expanded. In contrast, stock purchase plan, attendance bonus and 
length of service bonus declined$VLQWKHVHPSOR\HU¶VPRWLYHVFRXOGEHGLYLded into 
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two broad contrasting categories. ,QFDVHRI³SDWHUQDOLVWLF´PRWLYHVHPSOR\HUVEHOLHYHGWKH\
KDGWRFRQWULEXWHWRDVVLVWDQGXSOLIWWKHXQIRUWXQDWHZKHUHDV³OLEHUDOLVW´HPSOR\HUVYLHZHG
the standards of the day as unacceptably low (Gitelman, 1992: 21, 29-30; see about corporate 
liberalism also McQuaid, 1978: 342-368). 
Finally, Sanford M. Jacoby has put American welfare capitalism in a wider historical 
perspective than the other authors mentioned. This resulted in a relevant distinction between 
(classical) welfare capitalism and modern welfare capitalism. The latter developed after 
:RUOG:DU,,DQGGRHVQ¶WFRQFHUQVRPXFKWKHVXEVWDQWLYHSDUWof welfare capitalism as its 
reinforced political dimension and the changed economic context (also Harris, 1982: 180-
184). 
In the transfiguration of classical welfare capitalism into modern welfare capitalism after 
World War II a limited number of large non-unionized American companies, such as Eastman 
Kodak, Sears Roebuck and Thompson Products played a pivotal role. This group of 
FRPSDQLHVPDUNHGE\-DFRE\DV³PRGHUQPDQRUV´EHORQJHGWRWKHYDQJXDUGof modernizing 
welfare capitalism. In contrast, highly unionized firms, such as GM, belonged to the laggards 
in this modernizing process. At best, as was the case with GM and other car companies, 
laggards developed a double-faced modern welfare capitalism, consisting of an 
institutionalized bargaining relationship with the UAW as well as an employee relations 
department, responsible for day-to-day employee matters (also: Harris, 1982: 168-175).  
Survey data about 40 companies show that between 1920-1940 GM was a laggard with 
UHVSHFWWRZHOIDUHFDSLWDOLVP$IWHU*0¶VZHOIDUHexpenditures remained below pre-
depression levels. In addition, there evolved a growing difference between the treatment of 
white-collar and blue-collar workers within the company. The only blue-collar-directed 
welfare program that survived was the group insurance plan. In the end, GM maintained 
implicit contractual relations with its white-collar workers, whereas blue-collar worker 
relations evolved towards explicit contracts and jurisprudence (Moriguchi, 2003: 27-28).  
$V-DFRE\DUJXHV³WKH*0-approach was Janus-OLNHWKHFRPSDQ\¶VXQLRQs faced a tough 
adversary in bargaining and contract administration, while the employees were shown a more 
KXPDQYLVDJHDVWKHFRPSDQ\VRXJKWWRHVWDEOLVKGLUHFWSHUVRQDOWLHVZLWKWKHP´-DFRE\
1997: 245). This approach brought about irritation on the side of the UAW as, for example, 
was the case with the ³0\-RE&RQWHVW´ which was initiated in 1947 by the employee 
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relations department. GM-workers were asked to write an essay about their job and why they 
liked it. Subsequently, these essays were judged and among the winners $ 150,000 in prizes 
were distributed. The judging process was assigned to five prominent external individuals, 
such as famous management guru Peter Drucker, a renowned journalist, a U.S. Commissioner 
of Education and two DFDGHPLFV*0¶VPDLQREMHFWLYHZLWKWKHFRQWHVWZDVWRLPSURYH
ZRUNHU¶s morale, but also creating a good impression of GM at the same time (also Raucher, 
1987: 221-232).   
As has been argued, after World War II the political dimension of welfare capitalism became 
more apparent. 
According to Jacoby, modern welfare capitalism emerged as an alternative to liberalism and 
laborism. In fact, modern welfare capitalism developed as a separate but overlapping 
HPSOR\PHQWV\VWHPWRLQGXVWULDOXQLRQLVP%\WKHV´WKHXQLRQDSSURDFKHPERGLHGWKH
dynamics of labor-management conflict, emphasizing legality and industrial solidarity, while 
welfare capitalism accented the corporative side of the workplace and was psychological in 
nature and enterprise-RULHQWHG´-DFRE\ 
Against the backdrop of the battle between employers and unions over the Taft-Hartley Act in 
the second half of the 1940s, the new employment system also expressed itself in the 1950s 
by transferring union jobs to the less unionized South (Jacoby, 1997: 255). 
The economic context also changed dramatically after World War II, if compared with the 
1920s and 1930s. Fordism was ultimately replaced by Post-Fordism. Likewise, the 
composition of the workforce altered to more white-collar and less blue collar and as a 
consequence became also more feminized.  
Taken together, according to Jacoby, this implied that modern welfare capitalism fitted much 
better with the economic and social trends of the 1970s, whereas trade unionism succeeded in 
filling the gap of broken promises of employers during and in the wake of the Great 
Depression (Jacoby, 1997: 238, 258).   
To wrap up this paragraph on welfare capitalism the following conclusions can be drawn. 
First of all, it can be argued that, although there are some differences of opinion between 
labor and industrial experts, welfare capitalism clearly survived World War II. Also between 
1950 and 1980 it played a pivotal role in American industrial and labor relations. Therefore, at 
least in large American corporations, welfare capitalism remained a viable employment 
system aimed mainly at union evasion and improvement of production after World War II. As 
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a consequence, with respect to job and worker control, it operated as a serious competitor vis-
à-vis trade unionism and the collective bargaining system dominated by the unions. 
What is more, likewise the political dimension of welfare capitalism as a serious alternative to 
liberalism and laborism got more weight and significance after World War II. In that respect, 
it is justified to contend that modern welfare capitalism also contributed to the gradual 
postwar decline of unionism and the power of organized labor in the U.S. In contrast to 
unionism, modern welfare capitalism not only fitted better with the economic and social 
trends of the 1970s. In a wider historical perspective the paternalist and social reform aspects 
inherent to welfare capitalism continued to appeal to many workers at the same time.    
6.2 Role and significance of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)9 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), still operational today, was the administrative 
agency that carried out the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) of 1937 and its 
successor the Taft-Hartley Act (1947). 
The main task of the NLRB was determining appropriate units for collective bargaining, 
conducting secret ballot representation elections to determine if a labor organization had 
majority support, and prosecuting unfair labor practices provisions of the Wagner Act and its 
successor (Gross, 2010: 63). 
Because of the fact that the interpretation of Taft-Hartley has been ambiguous from the onset, 
the NLRB has played an unusual, but significant role with respect to postwar American labor 
policy. In order to understand this significance, first of all, the relevant history of these laws 
will be sketched, including the passage and immediate aftermath of the Wagner Act and the 
Taft-Hartley Act. Then, I will describe briefly the historical development of the NLRB until 
1980. Finally, I will pay attention to two historic NLRB-law cases that have been co-decisive 
to American postwar labor politics. These are the so-called Fibreboard case, which prevented 
union involvement in case of outsourcing of activities by a company and the General Electric 
(GE) case, which violated its collective bargaining process. 
Both cases form the overture to the next paragraph directed at management prerogatives and 
                                                                                                                    
9  This  Paragraph  is  mainly  based  on  the  important  work  of  James  A.  Gross,  professor  of  labor  law  at  the  School  
of  Industrial  and  Labor  Relations,  Cornell  University  (Gross  1974;  1981,  1995;  2010).  See  also  on  the  New  Deal  
Bargaining  Policy  until  about  1950  Bernstein  (Bernstein,  1950)  and  concerning  the  whole  postwar  period  Hogler  
(Hogler  2004).      
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the influence of interest groups, such as the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on politics and public opinion.    
After the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the new president launched a substantial package 
of legislation to combat unemployment and other negative social and economic consequences 
of the Great Depression during his first hundred days. One of its key-pieces was the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 16 June 1933. The core of this act was giving the authority 
to the business community to draft codes for entire industries covering production, prices, 
labor relations, wages and working hours. Likewise, workers got the right to organize and to 
collective bargaining. This addition was realized by Democratic senator Robert F. Wagner 
and included in Section 7a of the NIRA. As Auerbach puts forward, the principles enunciated 
in Section 7a became the cornerstone of the New Deal bargaining policy (Auerbach, 1969: 
363)10. 
Despite the fact that the overwhelmingly conservative Supreme Court declared the NIRA 
XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQ1,5$¶V6HFWLRQDUHDSSHDUHGDV6HFWLRQLQWKH:DJQHU$FW
adopted by Congress in 1935. After 5RRVHYHOW¶VIDLOHGDWWHPSWE\PHDQVRIKLVKLJKO\
GLVSXWDEOH³FRXUW-SDFNLQJSODQ´WRDSSRLQWVL[PRUHOLEHUDOMXGJHVWRWKHRQEDODQFH
conservative Supreme Court in February 1937, nevertheless, the mood of the Supreme Court 
moved almost overnight into the GLUHFWLRQRIVXSSRUWLQJ5RRVHYHOW¶V1HZ'HDOOHJLVODWLRQ
(Shesoll, 2010). This was caused by a sustainable move of swing-Judge Owen Roberts 
towards the progressive part of the Supreme Court. From then on five of the nine Supreme 
Court judges endorsed RooseYHOW¶V1HZ'HDOWRDODUJHH[WHQW. As a consequence, the 
Supreme Court also declared the Wagner Act constitutional in July 1937.  
In the wake of the Wagner Act there was an unprecedented upsurge of organized labor at the 
company level, particularly due to the new Section 7 in the Wagner Act, which read: 
³(PSOR\HHVVKDOOKDYHWKHULJKWWRVHOI-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to 
engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
SURWHFWLRQ´$XHUEDFK 
Senator Robert F. Wagner hoped that the Wagner Act itself would contribute to the 
                                                                                                                    
10  The  ideas  of  worker  self-­‐organization  and  bargaining  with  management  were  not  completely  new.  Already  
the  War  Labor  Board  in  World  War  I  and  later  on,  several  industrial  commissions  propagated  them.  They  were  
also  included  in  court  decisions  and  railway  legislation  (Gross,  1974:  4)  
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development of industrial democracy in the U.S. by giving workers a voice in industry and 
welcomed WKHQHZODZDVD³EXOZDUNRILQGXVWULDOSHDFHDQGMXVWLFH´*URVV 
From the beginning, Section 7 and its predecessor not only met with fierce resistance of the 
Supreme Court but also of management and employers. Therefore, in the Wagner Act also a 
NLRB was introduced as administrative agency in order to quell conflict between 
management and labor and moreover, to support workers in order to realize their new 
acquired rights. 
The NLRB had two predecessors, the National Labor Board under the NIRA and 
subsequently the so-FDOOHG³2OG´RUILUVW1/5%7KHPDLQGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZR
forerunners and the Wagner NLRB was that the new NLRB now also got law enforcing 
powers. At the time of World War II, the War Labor Board succeeded the NLRB temporarily 
on January 1942.  
In 1947, the Wagner Act was amended fundamentally by its successor the Taft-Hartley Act. 
On balance, it became more employer-friendly and less labor-friendly.  
As Phillips-Fein contends, the Taft-Hartley Act mainly imposed a lot of restrictions on the 
ODERUPRYHPHQW³LWSUHYHQWHGV\PSDWK\VWULNHVZKHQRQHJURXSRIZRUNHUVVWULNHVRQEHKDOI
of another), banned secondary boycotts (when a union refuses to handle goods made by 
another, striking union), barred supervisory workers or foremen from joining unions, 
permitted states to pass right-to-work laws that prohibited contracts with provisions stating 
that union membership was a mandatory condition of employment, and required all union 
officers to sign affidavits sZHDULQJWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRW&RPPXQLVWV´3KLOOLSV-Fein, 2009: 31-
32). 
In order to understand this development correctly, it is necessary to summarize briefly the 
evolution and fortunes of the three labor boards until the passage of Taft-Hartley.    
As has been contended, the first labor board was established in the context of the NIRA in 
1933. Contrary to the later Wagner-NLRB, the National LDERU%RDUGGLGQ¶WKDYHFRQWURORI
its decisions. This was reserved to the Compliance Division of the National Recovery Act 
(NRA) and the US Department of Justice. Based on Section 7a NIRA, tKH%RDUG¶VPDLQ
function was solving conflicts between management and labor. However, its mandate was 
UDWKHUYDJXH³WRFRQVLGHUDQGVHWWOHGLIIHUHQFHVRYHUWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V5H-
HPSOR\PHQW$FW´1/%¶VVXFFHVVHVWKHUHIRUHGHSHQGHGYHU\PXFKXSRQYROXQWDU\
cooperation between employers and unions (Gross, 1974: 17). 
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Ultimately, the NLB was abolished by Executive Order in June 1934 and succeeded by the 
³2OG´1/5%/LNH the NLB, the Old NLRB also missed the compliance authority and 
because of that likewise failed to enforce Section 7a. 
On August 30, 1934 the NLRB decided that Section 7a not only implied a union right to 
bargain, but at the same time an employer duty to bargain. 
Subsequently, the Wagner Act required a new NLRB that could act as independent labor 
Supreme Court. This board had to solve two fundamental questions of constitutional law, 
³ZKHWKHU&RQJUHVVDQGWKHUHIRUHWKH1/5%KDGDXWKRULW\XQGHUWKHFRPPHUFH clause to 
apply the provisions of the Wagner Act to employer-employee relations and whether those 
SURYLVLRQVZHUHYDOLGXQGHUWKHGXHSURFHVVUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ´*URVV
190).  
After the implementation of the Wagner Act in 1937, the new NLRB tried to enforce as 
stringently as possible the new act and to formulate thus a national labor policy. This gave rise 
to serious opposition, not only of employers, but also of Republicans in Congress. Most 
important was the initiative of archconservative Republican senator Howard Smith to 
formulate a more employer-friendly Wagner Act. This became the Smith Bill that ultimately 
failed in the Senate Labor Committee. The Smith Committee, which assessed the NLRB and 
prepared the bill, appeared to be a poZHUIXOLQLWLDWLYHWR³UHJDLQPDLQWDLQDQGLQFUHDVHWKH
SRZHURI$PHULFDQLQGXVWU\EXVLQHVVDQGWKH$)/´DQGWXUQHGRXWWREH³DZDWHUVKHGLQWKH
KLVWRU\RIWKH1/5%DQG$PHULFDQODERUSROLF\´*URVV6PLWKDQGKLV
committee were helped by pointing their arrows at the presence of communists and political 
leftists in the administrative apparatus of the NLRB. This contributed to a split of the agency. 
Its public image became that of a radical and biased agency (Gross, 1981: 150).   
After senator Smith also forged an alliance with AFL chairman William Green, the House 
approved the Smith Bill in the Spring of 1940, but it died later in the Senate. However, as we 
will see, its principles survived in the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act. 
The upsurge of organizeGODERULQWKHVHFRQGKDOIRIWKHVVXEVWDQWLDOO\HQODUJHGODERU¶V
power at the time and directly after World War II. Likewise, this development elicited the 
opposition of employers. 
In 1945 union membership had increased to fifteen million, five times more than in 1933 
(Brody, 1993: 157). At least for a while, labor had become a power to be taken seriously.  
On November 5, 1945, important unions, AFL, CIO and organized business joined the 
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National Labor-Management Conference initiated by the new Democratic president Harry F. 
Truman. Primary goal was settling industrial peace. But the employers also raised anxieties on 
further expansion of collective bargaining and union power at the cost of a further loss of 
managerial powHURUWKH³ULJKWWRPDQDJH´,n the background, at almost the same time, 
Walter Reuther and the UAW had challenged GM with a big national strike, requiring a thirty 
per cent wage increase and no rise in the price of cars. To GM this big strike also implied a 
challenge of maintaining discretion over important management prerogatives vis-à-vis the 
unions. In the end, GM accepted wage increases but no price stability. Wages belonged to the 
bargaining table, whereas pricing remained a management prerogative (Brody, 1993: 159-
160). I will return to this issue more extensively in the next paragraph.      
According to labor lawyer James Gross the Labor-Management Relations Act or Taft-Hartley 
Act of 1947, from the onset was ambiguous and due to this, would have far reaching 
consequences for postwar American labor policy. This ambiguity was caused by the fact that 
Taft-Hartley on the one side still supported the collective bargaining rights of workers as 
defined in Section 7 of the Wagner Act, but on the other hand also reinforced the rights of 
employers vis-à-vis the trade unions of the new act. For example, Taft-Hartley explicitly (re-) 
LQVWDOOHGHPSOR\HU¶VULJKWRIµIUHHVSHHFK¶LQWKHQHZDGGHG6HFWLRQF³WKHH[SUHVVLQJRIDQ\
views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether written, printed, graphic, 
or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of any unfair labor practice under any 
provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise or 
EHQHILW´FLW*URVV 
Despite the fact that this amendment could formally be considered as guaranteeing equal 
employee and employer rights, in practice it GLGQ¶WZRUNRXWneutrally and indulged 
HPSOR\HU¶VSRZHU$V:DJQHUKLPVHOIDUJXHGLWZRXOGEHFRPH³WKHSULPDU\LQVWUXPHQWXVHG
by HPSOR\HUVWRGLVFRXUDJHXQLRQL]DWLRQDQGFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJ´FLW*URVV
6HFWLRQFOLNHZLVHLQFUHDVHGHPSOR\HU¶VMREFRQWURODWWKHFRPSDQ\OHYHO)XUWKHUPRUHLQ
the Declaration of Policy of Taft-Hartley, added to the act by Congress, collective bargaining 
ZDVQ¶WPHQWLRQHG,QVWHDGLWZDVVWDWHGWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHDFWZDVWRSURWHFWWKHULJKWVRI
individual employees in their relations with labor organizations. This would give individual 
workers the right to refrain from engaging in collective bargaining (also added to Section 7 of 
Taft-Hartley). 
Gross contends that the more employer friendly character of Taft-Hartley was directly 
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influenced by the critical NLRB investigation by anti-New Deal congressman Howard Smith 
in 1939-³7KH+DUWOH\%LOOZDVDFWXDOO\ZULWWHQLQ6PLWK¶VRIILFHXVLQJKLVXQVXFFHVVIXl 
ODERUELOODVDPRGHO´(Gross, 1995: 2-3).  
Many contemporary observers considered Taft-Hartley as an important piece of anti-labor 
legislation. Most extreme in its forfeit was AFL. It wanted a complete repeal. And although 
also President Truman vetoed the bill, ultimately it passed Congress by a two third majority.  
The inherently ambiguous character of Taft-Hartley made it a complicated matter to 
administer the Act by the new 1/5%³%HFDXVHWKHUHZHUHSRWHQWLDOO\FRQIOLFWLQJVWDWXWRU\
purposes in the Taft-Hartley Act, the new five-member NLRB was in the unique position of 
choosing between different labor policies and, over time and political administrations, of 
swinging labor SROLF\IURPRQHSXUSRVHWRLWVGLUHFWRSSRVLWH´*URVV7KDWZDV
indeed what happened. 
The Democratic or Republican color of the various administrations after the Truman-
administration influenced significantly the outcome of the NLRB. Because of that, the NLRB 
became a highly politicized agency. This was further reinforced by the virtual absence of the 
presidents themselves and Congress regarding (new initiatives to) labor law making in the 
decades following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. *URVVDUJXHVWKDWDVDUHVXOW³WKHUROHV
of Congress, the NLRB, and the Supreme Court in making national labor policy have been 
blurred and confused. When Congress abdicates its legislative function, the NLRB assumes a 
far greater than normal role in making labor policy. Because of the legislative vacuum and 
ambiguity, moreover, the making of national labor policy has also passed by default from 
&RQJUHVVWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´*URVV 
The most labor-friendly and at the same time least employer-friendly NLRB was the 
Kennedy-Johnson Board in the 1960s. This board required employers to accept unions as 
equal bargaining parties with respect to wages, hours and working conditions. Labor-related 
issues had to be resolved by joint employer-union decision-making (Gross, 1995: 274).  
In particular, due to this, the Kennedy-Johnson Board also induced a strong and organized 
opposition of powerful employers.  
One significant example in this respect is the so-called Fibreboard Paper Product Corporation 
case.  
The Fibreboard Corporation wanted to contract out its maintenance work against the wish of 
the union. The Eisenhower Board decided that this matter concerned a management 
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SUHURJDWLYHDQGEHFDXVHRIWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKH%RDUGWKHFRPSDQ\GLGQ¶WKDYHDVWatutory 
obligation to bargain about its decision with the trade union. Subsequently, the successive 
Kennedy-Johnson Board overruled this decision. Finally, due to employer opposition the 
Fibreboard decision reached the Supreme Court in the mid 1960s. 
However, the Supreme Court upheld the Kennedy-Johnson Fibreboard decision in 1964 and 
HPSKDVL]HGWKDWFRQWUDFWLQJRXWPDLQWHQDQFHZRUNGLGQRWDIIHFW³WKHFRPSDQ\¶VEDVLF
operation, that no capital investment was involved, and that the company merely replaced 
existing employees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work under similar 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´*URVV 
Employers and their spokesmen remained fiercely opposed, even arguing that the future of 
American free enterprise was at stake. The Supreme Court decision marked the beginning of a 
strong and coordinated employer opposition at the national level (see next paragraph). 
Employer opposition became even stronger after the failure of a labor law reform bill 
propagated by AFL-CIO in 1978 (Gross, 1995: 278). 
Finally, successive Republican boards blocked Fibreboard and other pro-labor rulings of the 
NLRB. These boards reinstated management authority as regards management prerogatives, 
whilst subordinatLQJDWWKHVDPHWLPHHPSOR\HUV¶statutory obligation to collective bargaining. 
Another significant example of employer resistance against a labor-friendly decision of the 
NLRB during the Kennedy--RKQVRQHUDZDVWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQWKDW*HQHUDO(OHFWULFKDG
violated its collective bargaining process by dealing firstly with its employees and only in 
VHFRQGLQVWDQFHZLWKWKHXQLRQ,QWKLVSDUWLFXODUFDVH*(DSSOLHGD³PHUFKDQGLVLQJVWUDWHJ\´
ZKLFKLQFOXGHGPDNLQJXVHRI³DQHODERUDWHHPSOR\HHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVV\VWHPSODQW
newspapers, daily news digHVWVHPSOR\HHEXOOHWLQVDQGOHWWHUVWRHPSOR\HHV´ *(¶V
³PHUFKDQGLVLQJVWUDWHJ\´DOVRJRWNQRZQDV%RXOZDULVPDIWHU*(¶VYLFHSUHVLGHQWRI
HPSOR\HHDQGFRPPXQLW\UHODWLRQV/HPXHO5LFNHWWV%RXOZDUH%RXOZDULVPGLGQ¶WRQO\UHIHU
WR*(¶VSRVWZDUFRQWUDFWnegations philosophy, but also to a ceaseless education campaign in 
the ideology of the free market (Phillips-Fein, 2009: 100). 
$IWHUKHGHFLVLRQRIWKH1/5%*(DFFXVHGWKH%RDUGRI³GLFWDWLQJWKHEDUJDLQLQJSURFHVVWR
be followed, of assuming powers denied it by the act and the Supreme Court, of limiting 
freedom of speech, and of imposing new restrictions on the basic rights of management to 
operate a business responsibly, efficiently, and profitably and to stay competitive and provide 
MREV´*URVV 188-189). 
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6.3 Management prerogatives and the influence of business interest groups 
In his most recent book James Gross touches upon the issue of the significance of private 
property rights for American business (Gross, 2010: 43-103). History has shown that in 
American capitalism private property rights have always been primordial and, on balance, 
much more important than worker rights, such as freedom of association as guaranteed by the 
Wagner Act. Private property is also seen by the general public as an American value and is 
part of a broader national philosophy encompassing also the principle of free enterprise, free 
trade, and a deregulated economy. This free market philosophy is undergirded by the 
Common law system that is a system of primarily judge-made law. As a result, also the 
MXGLFLDU\V\VWHPVXSSRUWHGEXVLQHVVRQEDODQFHE\OLPLWLQJHPSOR\HU¶VOLDELOLW\IRULQMXULHVWR
employees and complementary business-IULHQGO\GRFWULQHVRIWKHµIHOORZVHUYDQWUXOH¶
µFRQWULEXWRU\QHJOLJHQFH¶DQGWKHµDVVXPSWLRQRIULVN¶11. Later in time these doctrines were 
enlarged with the doctrine of freedom of contract, guaranteeing the employer unilateral power 
to make rules.  
It was only during the Great Depression that the Wagner Act for the first time in American 
history corrected to some extent the power of business by introducing worker rights. This 
UHVXOWHGDFFRUGLQJWR*URVVLQDFODVKRIULJKWVDQGYDOXHVEHWZHHQHPSOR\HU¶VIUHHGRPRI
enterprise, freedom of contract, freedom of property and freedom of speech in the one side, 
DQGRQWKHRWKHUKDQGZRUNHU¶VIUHHGRPRIDVVRFLDWLRQ 
One of the most significant clashes in this respect was the conflict over the scope of collective 
EDUJDLQLQJ7KLVLVVXHGLUHFWO\WRXFKHGWKHLVVXHRIHPSOR\HU¶VSUHURJDWLYHV0RVWLPSRUWant 
was the right to manage as such. But apart from that, also other prerogatives were at stake, 
such as: determination of products to be manufactured, location of the business, plant lay-out, 
equipment to be used, methods of production, financial policies, prices, selection of 
employees for promotion, job duties, work assignments, production standards, scheduling of 
operations, and the maintenance of discipline (Gross, 2010: 85). 
At two moments in the last century enlarging the power of workers and organized labor 
significantly reduced management prerogatives. 
                                                                                                                    
11  The  fellow  servant  rule  is  the  rule  under  which  an  employee  cannot  sue  his  employer  for  the  injuries  caused  
by  the  negligence  of  another  employee.  Contributory  negligence  is  the  doctrine  under  which  an  employee  
cannot  recover  from  an  employer  if  he  was  negligent  himself.  The  assumption  of  risk  is  the  doctrine  that  an  
employee  cannot  recover  if  he  had  put  himself  voluntarily  in  a  dangerous  position  (Gross,  2010:  53-­‐54).  
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The first moment was the New Deal period with as its most important result the 
implementation of the Wagner Act in 1937. The second memorable moment was the 
Kennedy-Johnson period in the 1960s resulting in a labor friendly NLRB and the social 
programs of the Great Society. Both moments caused a strong employer opposition, both at 
the company level and at the political level resulting in repairing at least a substantial part of 
the lost terrain. 
Let us first reconsider the aftermath of the Wagner Act.  
The principal idea of Senator Wagner was to create in the U.S. a system of corporatist 
industrial democracy by introducing the freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
This caused an enormous upsurge of organized labor in the wake of the implementation of the 
Act until the beginning of the 1950s. As Harris contends, in particular after World War II the 
stakes were very high, that is: control over the work place, influence in the wider political 
comPXQLW\DQG³SHUKDSVWKHYHU\VXUYLYDORIWKHIUHHHQWHUSULVHV\VWHPLWVHOI´+DUULV
7). Likewise, employers were anxious that the field of collective bargaining would further 
expand into the domain of management in the postwar years (Brody, 1993: 159). A significant 
example was the big GM strike of 1945. Walter Reuther, to some extent, crossed the line of 
perceived management prerogatives by not only demanding a thirty percent wage increase, 
but also no rise in existing price levels of cars (Brody, 'H*LHU*0GLGQ¶W
give in its management prerogative as regards to pricing. What is more, the company also 
defined future bargaining terms. This included the following subjects: acceptance of the 
union, prohibition of bargaining on matters belonging to the management sphere, denying the 
union a place on the management side of the line, and keeping authority over matters of 
discipline. In other words, GM safeguarded its right to manage, also with respect to employee 
relations (Brody, 1993: 169). 
0RUHLQJHQHUDOHPSOR\HUV¶UHDFWLRQDWWKHFRPSDQ\OHYHOFRQVLVWHGRIYDULRXVLQLWLDWLYHV
such as union evasion, neutralizing the shop steward system, limiting the scope of collective 
bargaining, automation of production, replacement of employment to the (Mid-)West and the 
South, etc. (Brody, 1993: 157-198).  At the political and administrative level reforming the 
:DJQHU$FWEHFDPHHPSOR\HUV¶WRSSULRULW\-DFRE\8OWLPDWHO\WKH7DIW-
Hartley Act would recover part of the lost influence of employers. For example, GM, Ford 
DQGRWKHUODUJHFRUSRUDWLRQVOLPLWHGDQGUHGXFHGWKHGHJUHHRIZRUNHUV¶FRQWURO³RYHUWKHLU
RZQFRQGLWLRQVRIHPSOR\PHQWYLDFROOHFWLYHDJUHHPHQWRUFRQFHUWHGSUHVVXUH´+DUULV
9).  
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The Kennedy-Johnson period was marked by the struggle for civil rights, the Vietnam War 
and the upsurge of the New Left. This struggle not only influenced significantly the American 
political system, but also the position of organized labor and not in the least also the position 
and public image of employers. Particularly important in this period, was the progressive 
Kennedy-Johnson NLRB issuing the labor-friendly Fibreboard and Darlington cases. 
)LEUHERDUGUXOHGHPSOR\HU¶VVWDWXWRU\REOLJDWLRQWREDUJDLQZLWKWKHXQLRQWKH
cRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRFRQWUDFWRXWLWVEDUJDLQLQJXQLWPDLQWHQDQFHZork. The Darlington case 
(1962) concerned the initiative of the Darlington Manufacturing Company of South Carolina 
to close an entire plant to avoid unionization. The NLRB rejected this (Gross, 2010: 88-91).  
Both NLRB-cases roused adamant employer opposition because they crossed the line of 
perceived management prerogatives. This resulted in the mid-1960s in the creation of a 
steering committee consisting of twelve top management executives. This group became 
NQRZQDVWKH³7ZHOYH$SRVWOHV´RU³1R-1DPH&RPPLWWHH´DQGPRUHIRUPDOO\HYHQWXDOO\DV
the Labor Law Reform Group (LLRG). The intention of the LLRG was to bundle the until 
that moment rather dispersed employer opposition. After adding three more groups, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee (BRC) of more than one hundred lawyers of large corporations, the 
Legislative Committee for political lobbying and a Trade Association Coordinating 
Committee encompassing some forty trade associations, the LLRG initiated a substantial 
labor law reform project, consisting of: 
(a) a section-by-section analysis of Taft-Hartley and developing amendments; 
(b) a number of attitude surveys to determine ways to influence public opinion favorable 
respective labor law reforms as proposed by the LLRG; 
(c) the application of a sophisticated public relations campaign (Gross, 2010: 93; Gross, 1995: 
202-204).   
7KHUHIRUPSURMHFWUHVXOWHGRQ1RYHPEHULQDQH[WHQVLYHGRFXPHQWHQWLWOHGµ/DERU
/DZ5HIRUP6WXG\¶*URVVFRQWHQGV WKDWWKLVUHSRUW³LQHVVHQFHZDVDFDWDORJRIZKDW
employers believed the most repugnant McCulloch Board decisions, matched with a series of 
OHJLVODWLYHDPHQGPHQWVGHVLJQHGWRUHYHUVHWKRVHGHFLVLRQV´*URVV 
The LLRG can be considered as the ultimate result of organized political employer resistance 
against the New Deal and the Great Society or progressive liberalism in the U.S. 
In 1972 the LLRG merged with two other organizations, the March Group (a small group of 
executives) and the Construction Users Anti-Inflation Roundtable (a group of employers 
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fighting for business-friendly labor laws and against construction unions) into the important 
and still powerful business lobby organization, the Business Roundtable (Phillips-Fein, 2009: 
192).  
As Phillips-)HLQGHVFULEHVFRQFLVHO\LQKHUUHFHQWERRNRQWKHEXVLQHVVPHQ¶VFUXVDGHDJDLQVW
the New Deal, employer resistance against employee-friendly politics increasingly took shape 
VLQFHWKH¶VYLDWKHH[LVWLQJLPSRUWDQWQDWLRQDOHPSOR\HURUJDQL]ations the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) dating from 1895 and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
since 1798, as well as new initiatives such as lobby organizations, think tanks, radio stations 
and magazines (Philips-Fein, 2009). Important actors in this respect were, for example: the 
American Liberty League, the Foundation for Economic Education (FEE), the Mont Pelerin 
Society, the John Birch Society, the American Enterprise Association (later the American 
Enterprise Institute), the National Heritage Foundation, the National Review and the Business 
Round Table. The main intellectual inspirators of these groups, often financially supported by 
big manufacturing firms such as GM, Ford, GE and U.S. Steel, were free market propagating 
economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich von Hayek. 
Both representatives of large corporations and small business played an important role in 
these initiatives (Burch, 1973: 97-130). A substantial part of these persons adhered to the 
right, and often was archconservative.  From the 1960s onward business also merged with the 
religious right into the New Right. With the endorsement of many corporate Political Action 
&RPPLWWHHV3$&¶VWKH1$0DQGWKH86&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFHWKLVXOWLPDWHO\
FXOPLQDWHGLQ5RQDOG5HDJDQ¶VSUHVidency in 1980.    
Coming back, finally, to the results of the LLRG, it can be argued that this group also 
influenced the Supreme Court decision on the Fibreboard case in 1965. Despite the fact that 
the Supreme Court upheld the original NLRB ruling that the employer was obliged to bargain 
with the union about contracting out bargaining unit maintenance work, the Court restricted 
its ruling to the specific facts of this case that is requiring the obligation to bargain under the 
limited circumstances of this particular case. Therefore, to the Supreme Court eventually, 
HPSOR\HU¶VLQWHUHVWVUHPDLQHGSUH-dominant. 
7KLVZDVDOVRWKHFDVHLQ'DUOLQJWRQ+HUHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWGHFLGHGWKDW³VRPH
management decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they must be 
free of government regulation, namely the right to close the business completely even if for 
anti-XQLRQUHJXODWLRQ´*URVV 
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3HUKDSVLWLVQ¶WH[DJJHUDWHGWRFRQFOXGHZLWK6WHYH)UDVHUDQG*DU\*HUVWOHWKDWWRGD\ZH
live among the ruins of the New Deal (Gerstle & Fraser, 2005: 290). The New Deal policy 
that was intended to replace industrial autocracy with industrial democracy failed by reversing 
employee rights into political and administrative protection of management prerogatives after 
World War II (c.f. Gross, 2010, 102). 
6.4 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I analyzed the second research question with respect to the development of 
personnel management in large American corporations as related to the bargaining policy of 
the trade unions. At its core, it concerned the question of which party actually disposes of job 
and worker control. Are these management and employers or trade unions and organized 
labor? 
It appeared that the historic battle of job and worker control is fought at different levels with 
different strategies, both at the shop floor and company level and at the institutional and 
political level. Three parties are involved: organized labor (workers and their unions), 
employers (management, employer interest and lobby organizations) and the state (Presidents, 
Congress, Courts and administrative agencies). 
With hindsight, it can be argued that despite notable exceptions (New Deal period, Kennedy-
Johnson era) trade unions and organized labor ultimately have lost the battle of job control. 
The causes were many. In this chapter I paid attention to the pivotal importance of welfare 
capitalism, first of all in non-unionized firms, but also in unionized firms. Also after World 
War II, modern welfare capitalism remained a serious competitor for unionization in the battle 
for job control. In particular in unionized firms it supported management to demarcate the 
lines of pivotal management prerogatives or the rights to manage. Management prerogatives 
were also safeguarded at the level of national labor policy by correctional legislation (Taft-
Hartley Act), cases of the NLRB and Supreme Court Cases. 
(YHQLQWKHFDVHRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ*0DQGWKH8$:WKH8$:FRXOGQ¶WFURVVWKH
principal line of management prerogatives. 
Another pivotal factor was the evolving collaboration between employers via the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, the NAM and a series of new and ultimately successful business 
lobby organizations, such as the powerful Business Roundtable. The organized business lobby 
appeared in particular successful on dismantling the labor-friendly gains of the second liberal 
reform wave in the 1960s.  
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7. The intricate and exceptional American labor-management model (1945-1980) 
In the preceding two chapters I described and analyzed the labor-management model in the 
U.S. in the period 1945-DVUHJDUGVFHQWHUILUPV$VLWWXUQHGRXWWKLVPRGHOKDVQ¶WEHHQ
a homogeneous model in terms of a rather stable tripartite social compact between organized 
labor, employers and the state. Rather, the model was highly disputed and contested by a large 
part of the center companies as well as, over time, by an increasing part of politics. 
First of all, a substantial part of the center companies remained nonunionized and applied 
strategies to keep the unions out. Other center companies, such as GM, developed parallel 
Janus-faced strategies with respect to workers and unions. On the one hand, companies like 
GM developed an employee-relations strategy based on prewar welfare capitalist traditions. 
On the other hand, companies like GM, at the same time developed sophisticated bargaining 
policies in collaboration with its trade unions. From a substantive viewpoint, these bargaining 
policies focused on a set of material provisions, which in nonunionized companies belonged 
to welfare work programs.  
A third group of center companies, for example GE with its ultimate choice for Boulwarism, 
shunned earlier bargaining policies and concentrated on capitalist welfare programs.  
In all three cases center companies were keen to safeguard management prerogatives. This 
also implied that collective bargaining was never allowed to cross the confines of 
management prerogatives. A decisive moment in this respect was the GM-strike of 1945, 
ZKHQ8$:¶VSUHVLGHQW:DOWHU5HXWKHULQWHQWLRQDOO\WULHGWRXQGHUPLQH*0¶VPDQDJHPHQW
prerogative on pricing.  
5HXWKHU¶VZD\RIDFWLQJZDVDOVRLQVSLUHGE\WKHSUHZDUVXFFHVVHVRIWKHODERU-friendly New 
Deal. Pivotal in this context was the passage and implementation of the Wagner Act, giving 
workers legal rights to organize in unions and collective bargaining. This resulted in a 
significant surge of power of organized labor. This development was reinforced by war 
experiences of organized labor. Despite a formal ban on strikes, organized labor was 
UHFRJQL]HGIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJDVDµVRFLDOSDUWQHU¶LQWKH:DU/DERU%RDUGDVZHOODVDVRFLDO
partner in tripartite economic planning activities during World War II. 
Also combined with high strike intensity at the end of the war period, this gave organized 
ODERUDSRZHUIXOPRPHQWXPDURXQG$WWKDWPRPHQWLWZDVQ¶WDOWRJHWKHUFOHDULIFHQWHU
employers and center companies would be able to resist the pressure of organized labor and 
subsequently had to concede with respect to the confines of management prerogatives. 
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On the other hand, the position of center companies and employers was not that bad. As the 
conservative pre-war Smith Bill and the Smith Committee make clear, even before the war 
Republicans were anticipating the end or mitigation of the New Deal after World War II. This 
resulted ultimately in the more employer-friendly Taft-Hartley Act in 1947. This act restored 
RQHRIWKHKLVWRULFDOLPSRUWDQWPDQDJHPHQWSUHURJDWLYHV7KDWZDVHPSOR\HU¶VULJKWRIIUHH
speech, embedded in tKHZLGHUUHFRJQLWLRQLQWKHODZRIPDQDJHPHQW¶VULJKWVWRPDQDJH 
With hindsight, everything else that occurred between 1945 and 1980 with regard to the 
American labor-management model seems of secondary importance. In essence, center 
companies and center employers defended and tried to further safeguard management 
prerogatives, including job and worker control, by applying a two tier-strategy, at the 
company level as well as at the state level. Organized labor mirrored this strategy where 
suited and possible. The AFL-CIO and the UAW, for example, betted, however in vain, on 
the Democratic Party as a natural partner to reverse first of all Taft-Hartley and additionally, 
realize an American social-democratic welfare state. The ultimate failure of the coalition 
EHWZHHQRUJDQL]HGODERUDQGWKH'HPRFUDWLFSDUW\ZDVQ¶WFDXVHGVRPXFKE\DQLQKHUHQW
impossibility to realize an American welfare state in the American context. More important 
were some occurrences this coalition could only partially handle, such as the issue of race and 
civil rights, the Vietnam War and the rise of the New Left and the gradual erosion of 
progressive forces in favor of the right in American society.     
Moreover, what makes the American management-labor model so special, if compared with 
postwar labor-management models in European countries, is not the failure to realize social 
democracy at both the company level and the national level. It is something radically 
different. When reconstructing the evolution of the American system of industrial and labor 
relations as regards center firms in a wider time frame (from the factory system to welfare 
capitalism and from welfare capitalism to the failure of social democracy in the U.S.), what 
stands out is the missed opportunity to make use of the gains of welfare capitalism in the New 
Deal- and postwar labor legislation. Perhaps the actual gap between the experiences of center 
firms with welfare capitalism and the later New Deal order has been too big. Building on the 
experiences of welfare capitalism could have prevented a lot of the postwar polarization 
between center employers, organized labor and the state. In the end, a more stable and 
sustainable labor-management model could have evolved. Another question is, if, for 
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example, the issue of civil rights and race would also have been formally solved. Surely, 
contingency always remains an unpredictable factor.         
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8. Conclusion and debate 
,VWDUWHGP\SDSHUE\FLWLQJ&RZLHDQG6DOYDWRUH¶VLQWULJXLQJSUHVXPSWLRQWKDWLQKLQGVLJKW
the New Deal period and its aftermath have to be considered primarily an exception and a 
byproduct of the Great Depression and not a potential linear development towards an 
(ultimately failed) American welfare state (Cowie & Salvatore, 2008). Although credible and 
attractive at first glance, I hope to have made clear that this supposition at least contains some 
IODZV,WKDVQ¶WEHHQVRPXFKWKHLQFLGHQFHRIWKH1HZ'HDOWKDWPDNHVLWH[FHSWLRQDODVZHOO
as the specific substantive course it has taken. If we take seriously the theorem of path-
dependency, also in my opinion, a more or less linear evolution over time of the system of 
industrial and labor relations in the U.S. could decidedly have resulted in a New Deal. 
However, taking into account the preceding historic phases of the factory system and welfare 
capitalism, the actual New Deal should have contained more elements of the preceding 
phases. In particular experiences with welfare capitalism in American center companies after 
World War I and in the 1920s should have co-FUHDWHGLQDPRUHVXEVWDQWLYHVHQVH5RRVHYHOW¶V
1HZ'HDO7KDWWKLVGLGQ¶WKDSSHQLVLQIDFWWKHUHDOH[FHSWLRQLQ$PHULFDQLQGXVWULDODQG
labor relations.       
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